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General Abstract 
The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used to detect malingered loss of memory for 
a specific event or malingered cognitive deficits. This test consists out of binary multiple 
choice questions. The idea is that genuine impairment will force examinees to guess, 
resulting in test scores that fall within chance performance. In contrast, malingerers are 
expected to select incorrect answers purposefully, leading to test scores below chance 
performance (i.e. underperformance). Four empirical studies were conducted on the FCT 
with two aims in mind. First, to develop a better theoretical understanding of malingerers’ 
response strategies in the FCT. Second, to increase the detection accuracy of the FCT and 
optimize the decision making process for single case decision.  
In Chapter 2 we address the lack of a theoretical foundation for malingerers’ 
behaviour by proposing a model that defines three distinct response strategies. With an 
empirical experiment we demonstrate that the proposed model fits the data well and 
conclude that that malingerers’ choice of response strategy can be influenced by the 
examiner. Furthermore, our model suggests that the traditionally used underperformance 
criterion is only sensitive to one of the three subgroups and that this group is actually a 
minority within the malingerer population. Based on these results we propose two 
pathways to improve the detection accuracy of the FCT. 
First, detection accuracy can be improved by promoting the prevalence of response 
strategies the underperformance criterion detects well. In Chapter 3 we attempt to do that 
by introducing cognitive load to the FCT paradigm. However, instead of affecting 
malingerers’ strategy selected, cognitive load affected the quality of their chosen strategies. 
Although unexpected, these findings provide another angle to influence the detection rate 
of the FCT. Nonetheless, further disambiguation is required. 
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Second, detection accuracy can be improved by adding new criteria to the FCT that 
are sensitive to the remaining subgroups. In Chapters 4 and 5 we investigate the effectives 
of the ‘runs test’ and a within test response bias. Both criteria proved effective in detecting 
a subgroup that manages to avoid the underperformance criterion and the usefulness of a 
two-step classification procedure is discussed. 
Finally, this thesis end with a reflection on the validity of our model based on the 
aggregated data from all previous chapters and a discussion about the decision making 
process. This is followed by a reflection on experimental limitations as well as 
recommendations for practical application. 
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1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Malingering and the validity of psychological examination 
Malingering, the simulation or exaggeration of cognitive deficits or memory loss, is a 
serious concern for the interpretation of psychological examinations. Slick (1999) 
suggested that malingering should be considered a possibility when a clinical diagnosis 
yields an incentive, such as a financial compensation or reduced sentencing in criminal 
cases. For example, around 25% of homicide cases feature claims of partial or complete 
memory loss (Cima, Nijman, Merckelbach, Kremer, & Hollnack, 2004). As the loss of 
memory may aid a suspect during his/her trial, the suspect may be motivated to feign the 
symptoms. The prevalence of malingering varies, but a general estimate suggests that 
between 20 to 30% of civil and criminal cases may be cases of malingering (see Cima et 
al., 2004; Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002).  
The consequences of malingering can be severe (see Rosen, & Phillips, 2004). 
First, Chafnetz and Underhill (2013) showed that feigned disability can incur large 
monetary costs due to fraudulent disability compensation. Second, malingering can cast 
doubt about the validity of a psychological examination. Consequently, institutions such as 
the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology (AACN; Chafetz et al., 2015; 
Heilbronner, Sweet, Morgan, Larrabee, Millis, & conference participants, 2009) and the 
Association for Scientific Advancement in Psychological Injury and Law (ASAPIL; Bush, 
Heilbronner, & Ruff, 2014) propose that malingering assessment tools should be included 
in a standard psychological examination.  
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1.1.2 The Forced Choice Test 
The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used as a tool to detect malingered sensory 
impairment (Pankratz, 1983). In essence, the FCT includes several trials, each presented 
with two possible answer alternatives. The examinee is asked to indicate the correct answer 
alternative, or to guess in case s/he is unaware. The total number of correct items selected 
is then interpreted in terms of how (un)likely it is to occur through guessing alone. For 
example, Pankratz, Fausti, and Peed (1975) carried out a FCT on a patient who claimed to 
suffer from loss of hearing. The patient was placed in front of a light that could either turn 
red or blue for two seconds. During one of the two trials, determined randomly, a 1000Hz 
tone was presented and the patient had to indicate on which trial (red or blue) he heard the 
tone. This procedure was repeated 100 times and the patient identified the correct trial 36 
times. Genuine loss of hearing would force the patient to guess on each trial, resulting in 
approximately 50 correct responses selected. Consequently, the observed test score can be 
expressed as the likelihood of occurring under chance performance according to the 
binomial distribution (see Siegel, 1956). In this case, 36 correct trials out of 100 leads to a 
p-value smaller than .004, which means that if the test was repeated 1000 times a patient 
with genuine impairment would be expected to produce less than four test results with a 
score like this or more extreme. Consequently, Pankratz, Fausti, and Peed (1975) 
concluded that the total score was too unlikely to have occurred by chance and, instead, 
was the product of deliberately selecting incorrect answers.  
Similarly, the FCT can be used to detect deceit in terms of malingered loss of 
memory for specific events. Denney (1996) was asked to assess the competency of three 
suspects to stand trial in three criminal cases. All three suspects claimed to have suffered 
memory loss during the offense. A unique FCT was created for each suspect specific to the 
offense. In each case the suspect was presented with a question (e.g., Was the gun fired?) 
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and two equally plausible answer alternatives (Yes/No). Suspects were instructed to select 
the correct answer alternative or guess in case they did not know it. All three suspects 
produced a total score very unlikely to occur by chance with fewer correct items selected 
than expected by chance performance, suggesting they purposefully selected incorrect 
answers to demonstrate their memory loss. 
 
1.2 Gap in literature and thesis outline 
Table 1.1 presents an overview of recent experiments investigating the diagnostic 
accuracy of the FCT in detecting malingered loss of memory for an event, excluding case 
studies. Together, these studies suggest  a detection rate for malingerers – sensitivity – 
between 40 – 60% and a detection rate for genuine impairment – specificity – around 95% 
(see Giger, Merten, Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, 
2004; Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 
2002; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2012; Verschuere, Meijer, & Crombez, 2008). 
When warned, sensitivity of the FCT declines significantly (see Giger et al., 2010; 
Verschuere et al., 2008). It is noteworthy, that these accuracy estimates are predominantly 
based on a single cut-off alone. Only two studies (Meijer et al., 2007; Shaw et al., 2012) 
report the general detection accuracy in terms of the Area Under the Curve (AUC), which 
is a sum of the detection accuracy estimates for all possible cut-offs. Finally, several 
studies lack control groups that is, specificity estimates, and many feature only minimal 
sample sizes. With these limitations and given the small number of experiments in total, 
the detection accuracy of the FCT remains far from certain. Hence, further research in the 
diagnostic utility of the FCT is needed.   
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Cases of underperformance can be attributed to intentional avoidance of correct 
answers (Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975). However, considering the estimated sensitivity, 
this explanation typically accounts for only half or less of the malingerers. Furthermore, 
when asked, some malingerers indicated understanding of the FCT rationale and also 
report other behaviours than strictly avoiding correct answers (Jelicic et al., 2004; Shaw et 
al., 2012). Currently, malingerers’ response strategies in the FCT lack a proper 
conceptualization. As such, it remains unclear what the specific strategies are and how 
sensitive the underperformance criterion is to each of them. Similarly, it is unknown how 
malingerers’ decide what response strategy to follow. Further investigation into 
malingerers’ response strategies is warranted, because this knowledge can serve as the 
basis to improve the detection accuracy further. 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a model of malingerers’ behaviour during 
a FCT. This thesis proposes a model that specifies three distinct response strategies and to 
suggest to use this model to modify the FCT paradigm to increase the overall detection 
accuracy. This PhD thesis features four studies reported in four separate chapters. These 
chapters are based on peer reviewed articles or articles submitted for peer review. They 
will contain some repeated information - each published article must be understandable on 
its’ own-and each chapter will feature its own reference section
18 
 
Table 1.1 Overview of empirical studies on the Forced Choice Test 
      Malingerers’ test response distribution (N) 
Study  
Critical 
(Total) 
FCT 
items 
Sensitivity 
(N) 
Specificity 
(N) 
AUC 
Under-
performance 
Chance 
performance 
Over-
performance 
Merckelbach et al., 2002 15 (15) 40% (20) - - 40% (8) 30% (6) 30% (6) 
Jelicic et al., 2004 25 (50) 59% (39) - - 59% (23) 26% (10) 15% (6) 
Van Oorsouw & 
Merckelbach, 2006* 
21 (40) 7% (27) 100% (30) - 7% (2) 60% (16) 33% (9) 
Meijer et al., 2007 – Study 1 12 (12) 27% (30) 100% (30) .70 27% (8) - - 
Meijer et al., 2007 – Study 2 12 (12) - (60) - (60) .87 - - - 
Verschuere et al., 2008 – 
Naïve  
25 (35) 58% (19) - - 58% (11) - - 
Verschuere et al., 2008 – 
Coached 
25 (35) 0% (19) - - 0% (0) - - 
Giger et al., 2010 – Naïve  19 (38) 45% (20) 90% (20)** - 45% (9) - - 
Giger et al., 2010 – Warned 19 (38) 10% (20) 90% (20)** - 10% (2) - - 
Shaw et al., 2014* 12 (12) 42% (86) 93% (82) .79 42% (36) 57% (49) 1% (1) 
Notes.  Studies marked with a * should be interpreted with care as they suffer methodological concerns such as biased FCT questions or errors in cut-off calculation. 
Specificity marked with ** refers to the same group. Giger et al., 2010 featured three groups only: naïve malingerer, warned malingerer, and examinees without crime 
knowledge (marked with **). 
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Throughout the next four chapters the experiments will feature cases of 
malingered loss of memory for crime events or malingered colour blindness. 
Consequently, different terms may be used for malingerers and genuine 
performance. Malingerers, examinees instructed to simulate loss of memory or 
sensory deficits, may be referred to as ‘liars’, ’examinees with concealed 
knowledge’, or ‘malingerers’. Genuine performance, through real impairment or 
ignorance of crime information, may be referred to as ‘truth tellers’, ’examinees 
without concealed knowledge’, or ‘genuine performance’. 
First, a new model for malingerers’ response strategies in the FCT is 
developed (chapter 2). Based on this model two approaches to increase detection 
accuracy of the FCT are investigated. On the one hand, detection accuracy could be 
increased by facilitating malingerers to choose response strategies that the FCT 
already detects well (chapter 3). On the other hand, detection accuracy could be 
increased by examining the validity of additional criteria that are sensitive to 
previously undetected subgroups of malingerers (chapters 4 and 5). 
 
Chapter 2: Strategy and Misdirection in Forced Choice Memory performance 
Testing in Deception Detection 
 This chapter deals with the lack of theoretical conceptualization of 
malingerers’ behaviour during a FCT. To address this, a model was devised based on 
Cognitive Hierarchy Theory (CHT; Carmerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004) and strategies 
derived from self-reports reported in previous studies.  According to CHT, 
examinees take the strategies of other players into account when developing their 
own strategy and the sophistication of this process is limited by the available 
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cognitive resources of the examinee. Another feature is that strategies are 
hierarchical, indicated with numeric levels, with higher levels being superior to 
lower. Here three strategy levels for malingerers in the FCT ranging from 0 to 2 were 
defined. A level 0 strategy predicts the examinee will endorse the correct 
information, resulting in overperformance (more items correct than expected by 
chance). A level 1 strategy predicts that the examinee will avoid selecting correct 
answers, resulting in underperformance. A level 2 strategy predicts that an examinee 
will provide a balanced mixture of correct and incorrect answers. Liars and truth 
tellers were subjected to a traditional FCT or to a FCT that included a fake polygraph 
examination to misdirect examinees’ beliefs about the detection mechanism of the 
FCT. Test performance and response strategy levels were measured. The main 
findings were that (i) substantial proportions of liars used level 2 strategies, which 
suggests correct understanding of the FCT’s detection mechanism; (ii) different 
strategy levels featured different detection accuracies; and (iii) examinees test 
behaviour could be influenced by misdirecting them from the test detection 
mechanism. Together, these findings provide the first support for our proposed 
model. Based on this knowledge, future manipulations of the FCT paradigm can be 
developed to increase the detection accuracy of the FCT. This experiment has been 
published in Orthey, Vrij, Leal, and Blank (2017).  
 
Chapter 3: Effects of Time Pressure on Strategy Selection and Strategy 
Execution in Forced Choice Testing 
This chapter draws on the model introduced in the previous chapter. As 
stated, the FCT is apt at detecting level 1 strategies, but not level 2 strategies. The 
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underlying theory assumes that higher order strategies require more cognitive 
resources. Therefore, if cognitive resources are limited examinees may be less likely 
to select a strategy level with poor detection accuracy (level 2) and instead promotes 
selection of lower order strategies (level 0 and 1), which are more easily detected. To 
limit the available cognitive resources time pressure was introduced to the FCT 
paradigm, by forcing examinees with and without concealed information to select an 
answer alternative within two seconds. This paradigm was compared with the 
traditional FCT in terms of strategy selection and detection accuracy. The main 
findings were that (i) selection of strategy levels was not affected by time pressure; 
(ii) in both the time pressure and traditional FCT, the number of correct items 
selected discriminated examinees with and without concealed knowledge better than 
chance; and (iii) examinees with concealed knowledge, who reported a level 2 
strategy, had selected fewer correct items under time pressure than in the traditional 
FCT paradigm, leading to a considerable higher proportion of cases at 
underperformance level in the time pressure FCT. These results suggest that time 
pressure is not suited to affect the strategy selection process, but instead affects 
execution of the strategy. That is, examinees who report level 2 strategies and intend 
to randomize between correct and incorrect answers, are expected to avoid detection 
by the underperformance criterion, as demonstrated in the standard condition 
limiting the overall detection accuracy of the FCT. The time pressure condition 
demonstrated that examinees, using the same strategy, were less successful in 
avoiding detection by the underperformance criterion. Consequently, cognitive load, 
in terms of time pressure, could be used to limit the effectiveness of a common and 
effective counterstrategy in the FCT. 
 
22 
 
Chapter 4: Resistance to Coaching in Forced-Choice Testing 
 This chapter examinees a new criterion to detect level 2 strategies and its 
value in dealing with cases of coaching. Coaching describes the act of an examinee 
seeking information on a forensic test prior to administration. This is a concern for 
the FCT, because once an examinee is aware of the underperformance criterion the 
examinee is likely to use a level 2 strategy and randomize between correct and 
incorrect answers. As the detection rate for level 2 strategies is poor, coaching is a 
threat to the validity of the FCT. The ‘runs-test’ has been suggested to measure the 
alternations between correct and incorrect answers. It is based on the idea that 
examinees who are unaware of the correct answer, have a likelihood of 50% to 
alternate between trials, thus like the traditional criterion, they are expected to 
produce a number of alternations within chance levels. In contrast, examinees who 
are aware of the underperformance criterion, are expected to alternate more 
frequently between correct and incorrect answers to ensure that the total number of 
correct items falls within chance levels. Hence, the ‘runs-test’ detects examinees 
using a level 2 strategy through elevated alternation rates between correct and 
incorrect answers. So far, empirical support suggests it is of limited value only 
(Jelicic et al., 2004; Verschuere et al., 2008). To increase the validity of the runs-test, 
examinees were forced to choose between a randomizing pattern that ‘looks’ random 
and a randomizing pattern that produces a test score within chance levels. To do so 
the position of the correct answer alternative (left or right) was alternated between 
trials as well. Consequently, alternating between correct and incorrect answers 
means only answers on the same side are selected, while alternating between 
answers presented on the left and right would lead to more extreme scores. Coached 
examinees were expected to prefer the former, while examinees who are genuinely 
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guessing, would prefer the latter pattern. Detection accuracy of the ‘runs-test’ would 
be increased, because both types of randomizing behaviour are anti-correlated, 
increasing the difference between both groups. The main findings were that (i) 
coaching was associated with level 2 strategies and underperformance was apt at 
detecting level 1, but not level 2 strategies; (ii) the runs-test was able to detect 
coached examinees with concealed knowledge; (iii) the underperformance criterion 
and runs-test criterion can be utilized as a 2-step classification procedure, with 
underperformance being sensitive to level 1 strategies and the runs-test to level 2 
strategies. Together these findings support the underlying strategy levels and their 
associated test scores as well as the need to detect level 2 strategies in order to 
increase detection accuracy of the FCT. This article was published as Orthey, Vrij, 
Meijer, Leal, and Blank (2018).  
 
Chapter 5: Eliciting Response Bias Within Forced Choice Tests to Detect 
Random Responders 
This chapter is focused on detecting level 2 strategies in case of malingered 
red/green blindness. Specifically, the validity of the ‘runs-test’ and a new criterion 
was evaluated. The idea behind the new criterion was to elicit a response bias within 
the generation process of a test score that falls within chance performance. 
Specifically, the aim was to introduce a manipulation, independent of the actual task 
(here to discriminate red and green), that elicits a systematic preference. The 
perceived difficulty of the trials was varied by manipulating the see-throughness of 
the stimuli, so malingerers could be more likely to select correct answers on trials 
that are clearly visible and be more likely to select incorrect answers when they are 
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not. If examinees attune their selection preference to the perceived difficulty of the 
trial, this systematic pattern would deviate from genuine guessing behaviour and 
could serve as a new criterion. Therefore, examinees were instructed to simulate 
red/green blindness and subjected them to a FCT of 100 trials embedded into a test 
battery. The FCT in the standard condition featured a bright red and a bright green 
rectangle on each trial. Additionally, in the opacity condition, the see-throughness of 
the rectangles was varied over the trials, creating the illusion that on some trials the 
correct answer would be more difficult to identify than on others. The validity of the 
‘runs-test’ was re-examined, because malingered sensory deficits, as opposed to 
malingered loss of memory, allows for the construction of FCTs with larger test 
sizes and the ‘runs-test’ should be more effective with longer tests. The main 
findings were that: (i) the runs-test did detect malingerers better than chance in the 
standard, but not in the opacity condition; (ii) malingerers produced more 
statistically significant response biases than expected by chance; and (iii) the 
probability of the individual response biases detected malingerers better than chance. 
These findings suggest that the ‘runs-test’ or a systematic association between 
perceived trial difficulty and endorsement of correct answers could be used as 
criterion to detect level 2 strategies in malingered sensory deficits. 
 
Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 Finally, the concluding chapter will re-examine the theoretical model 
suggested by the previous studies, discuss how detection accuracy should be 
estimated in a FCT, and evaluate the previous studies in terms of their practical 
relevance. 
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2.1 Abstract
1
 
We examined the response strategies of liars in the Forced Choice Test (FCT). 
Various response strategies have been observed and we attempt to categorise these 
strategies within the framework of Cognitive Hierarchy Theory. Furthermore, we 
investigated whether liars’ response strategies could be shaped through misdirection. 
95 undergraduate students were subjected to either a mock crime or a filler task. 
Then participants were either subjected to a standard FCT or a FCT that additionally 
featured a fake polygraph setup to distract from the FCT’s test mechanism. The 
results suggest that liars’ response strategies fit one of three categories and the 
categories correspond well to the observed test scores. The misdirection 
manipulation lowered the likelihood to see through the test’s mechanism for truth 
tellers, but not for liars. Finally, liars’ response patterns were shifted by the 
misdirection manipulation. Together these results support our proposed categories of 
liars’ response strategies.  
  
                                                          
1
 This abstract differs from the published version. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Concealed information detection is an indirect deception detection approach. 
The idea is to detect knowledge in suspects that only the investigators and the 
perpetrator are aware of and involvement is concluded by inference. If the suspect 
has intimate crime knowledge then s/he must be somehow involved in the crime. In 
this article we focus on Symptom Validity Testing (SVT). 
SVT started as a malingering detection tool for fake cognitive impairment 
(Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975). Pankratz et al. (1975) describe a case of alleged 
loss of hearing. They presented their examinee with a sound in one of two temporal 
intervals and asked which of the two contained the sound. The examinee was 
instructed to indicate the correct interval or guess if he did not know. This process 
was repeated over 100 of similar trials. In their case, the client indicated 36 out of 
100 times the correct time interval. The probability of having only 36 answers 
correct is smaller than .004. Therefore the authors considered the loss of hearing to 
be malingered. The idea behind this method is that genuine performance, that is 
impaired hearing capabilities, would force the examinee to guess on each trial. 
Consequently, the total test score is expected to fall within levels of chance. The 
authors infer malingering from underperformance, that is test performance worse 
than expected by chance, as a sign of deliberate avoidance of correct answers. 
Since then, a variety of SVT tools have been developed, but the core 
principle as described in Pankratz et al., (1975) remains the same throughout. In 
cases of deception detection or fake memory loss an event specific binary forced 
choice memory performance test is used (Bianchini, Mathias, & Greve, 2001; Van 
Oorsouw, & Merckelbach, 2010). Examinees are presented with questions about the 
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event and a pair of answer alternatives. One alternative is always correct, the other 
alternative is always incorrect. Liars are expected to display underperformance 
(because they recognize the correct answer and purposefully select the incorrect 
answer), while truth tellers, who have no knowledge of the event, are expected to 
score within levels of chance (because they actually guess). Empirical studies report 
a high (90-100%) classification rate for truth tellers (specificity) (Giger, Merten, 
Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007; 
Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2012), and a moderate detection rate (40-63%) 
for liars (sensitivity) (Giger et al., 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, 2004; 
Meijer et al., 2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; Shaw et al., 2012). In other 
words, 90 – 100% of truth tellers typically perform at chance levels, whereas 40 – 
63% of liars typically underperform. Overperformance – total scores better than 
chance – are currently not interpreted as diagnostic in forced choice memory 
deception detection. 
A major problem of the field is that little attention has been paid to the 
theoretical background of forced choice memory performance testing. Liars’ 
avoidance behaviour has been assumed but not explained. Exceptions are Shaw et al. 
(2012), who refer to a general avoidance tendency found in interviewing literature; 
and Meijer et al. (2007) who, apart from this avoidance tendency, also argue that 
examinees may fail the test due to their inability to produce genuine randomness. It 
seems that the generally accepted underlying mechanism of the forced choice 
performance tests is an avoidance preference of true crime information by liars. This 
theoretical concept can explain why the test detects liars, but it cannot explain why a 
considerable proportion of liars (often more than 50%) are not detected. Here we 
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propose and explore a new theoretical perspective on forced choice memory 
performance testing, which is also capable of predicting cases that avoid detection. 
Two studies provide hints to the underlying mechanism of forced choice 
memory performance testing. First, in their study Shaw et al. (2012) also presented 
the self-reported strategies of their participants. For liars, these included 
countermeasures to appear innocent, such as ‘avoiding correct information’, 
‘deliberately choosing incorrect answers’, or ‘motivated randomisation’. The latter 
strategies suggest an understanding of the test’s mechanism, as the authors noted 
themselves. In addition, they found that participants who understood the test’s 
rationale were also more likely to avoid being detected. Second, Verschuere, Meijer, 
and Crombez (2008) obtained the same effect when they compared coached liars 
(who were informed about the working of the test) with naïve liars. Coached liars 
escaped detection, while naïve liars were detected with the same accuracy as 
reported in other studies. Together this suggests that liars’ test behaviour is a product 
of their strategy and understanding of the test’s mechanism, which would not only 
explain why some liars are detected, but also why some are not detected by the test.  
One theory suited for analysing strategies in forced choice performance 
testing is Cognitive Hierarchy Theory (CHT; Camerer, Ho, & Chung, 2004). 
According to this theory a strategy can vary in its level of sophistication, which is 
the degree it accounts for an opponent’s strategy. These degrees are expressed in 
numerical levels. In this case, a level 0 strategy does not consider how the test tries 
to identify the examinee and the examinee may just comply with the test’s 
instructions (‘Select the correct answer, if you don’t know it guess.’). A level 1 
strategy would be based on the idea that the test identifies the guilty through their 
compliance to test instructions and therefore choose countermeasures that work 
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against these instructions (such as e.g. ‘deliberately avoiding correct information’). 
Subsequently, a level 2 strategy would assume that the test expects a level 1 strategy 
and therefore it consists of countermeasures to counter a level 1 strategy, for 
example to ‘deliberately include correct information’ or ‘making responses look 
random’. Theoretically, there is no limit to the strategy level, but a key feature of 
CHT is that the process of strategy selection is limited by the cognitive resources of 
the examinee. Carmerer et al. (2004) refer to an average level of 1.5, which means 
that the majority of people will either form a level 1 or 2 strategy. Thus, we 
conceptualize suspects’ behaviour in forced choice memory tests in terms of the 
sophistication of their chosen strategy. 
Given the assumption that understanding and strategy selection are crucial to 
the test’s detection efficiency (Shaw et al., 2012; Verscheure et al., 2008), we 
explore two questions. First, we will examine the role of strategy selection, as 
defined in CHT, in relation to detection efficiency. To do so, we will measure the 
examinee’s self-reported strategies, translate them into CHT terms, and examine 
which strategies the test detects and which not. We formulate the following 
hypotheses: (1) Liars who use level 1 strategies will be detected, but liars who use 
level 2 strategies will not be detected; (2) Liars will report higher order strategies 
than truth tellers; and (3) Specifically, we expect liars average strategy level to be 
higher than zero, but not truth tellers’, because they are assumed to comply with the 
test’s instructions and guess.  
Second, for two reasons we will investigate whether it is possible to influence 
the strategy selection itself. On the one hand liars not only need to behave differently 
from truth tellers, but their behaviour as a group must also be homogenous to ensure 
reliable detection accuracy. Shaw et al. (2012) demonstrate that liars choose from a 
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multitude of strategies, but the test is only designed to detect one of them (avoiding 
correct information). On the other hand, if we can influence the strategy selection 
process we can attempt to elicit new behaviours in liars that subsequently can be 
used for detection purposes. One example is overperformance, which is currently not 
conceptualized in deception detection, but it shares the same properties as 
underformance. Truth tellers will exhibit overperformance through chance, but liars 
are just as able to produce over- as underperformance (each requires the liars to 
recognize the correct answer). To elicit overperformance in liars we will utilize a 
misdirection of reasoning (Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014). By attaching 
half of our sample to a fake skin conductance response (SCR) sensor we intend to 
create the impression of a polygraph examination. This manipulation is based on the 
widespread believe that deception can be inferred from physiological signals. Since 
the SCR sensor is a very salient part of the test situation we expect it to act as a mask 
for the actual mechanism of forced choice memory performance testing. If 
examinees mistakenly believe that classification takes place through physiological 
measures, they are more likely to comply with the test’s instructions and actually 
select the correct answers, or only perform countermeasures against the 
physiological measurements. 
Here we attempt to elicit overperformance and formulate three hypotheses: 
(4) We expect our misdirection manipulation to decrease the likelihood that liars and 
truth tellers realize the actual classification mechanism of forced choice memory 
performance testing; (5) We expect examinees in the misdirection condition to use 
physiological countermeasures as their strategy to beat the test; and (6) We expect 
liars in the misdirection condition to produce more cases of overperformance 
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(significantly more questions correct than expected by chance) than liars in the 
control condition. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
A total of 95 undergraduate students and members of staff of the University 
of Portsmouth participated in this study. Three participants were excluded from the 
analysis, because they were familiar with the mechanism of forced choice testing or 
did not follow the instructions. The final sample consisted of 92 participants (37 
male & 55 female, mean age = 25.45, SD = 9.66). The experiment was approved by 
the ethics committee of the University of Portsmouth. 
 
2.3.2 Material 
An assumption of the forced choice memory performance testing is that the 
answer alternatives are equally plausible so that truth tellers (those who do not know 
the correct answers) will consider both answer alternatives for each question equally 
likely to be correct (Bianchini et al., 2001; Doob, & Kirschenbaum, 1973). We 
constructed 23 questions pertaining to the mock crime procedure. These 23 
questions, with two answer alternatives each, were then subjected to a pilot 
procedure to ensure that the answer alternatives were equally plausible. In this pilot 
participants were blind to the mock crime and presented with the questions and 
answer alternatives. They were tasked to indicate for each question the answer they 
thought was the most plausible. A set of answer alternatives was deemed plausible 
when one option was not more frequently chosen than 70% (just as in Jelicic et al., 
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2004; Merckelbach et al., 2002). In total, four pilot cycles (N = 24/20/20/21) were 
required to find for each question an equally plausible pair of answers.  
In total, twenty questions featured verbal answer alternatives and three 
questions featured pictorial answer alternatives. Pictures were taken from the 
Psychological Image Collection at Sterling (PICS; Hancock, 2014) face database.  
 
2.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were informed that they had to beat a lie detection test over a 
warehouse burglary. They were rewarded with either course credit (first year 
undergraduate students) or a £5 voucher (other participants). Additionally, they had 
the opportunity to win one of two £50 vouchers if they were able to appear innocent 
on the lie detection test. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a mock crime or an innocent 
condition. In the mock crime condition the participant (liar in the subsequent test) 
had to plan and execute a mock burglary. This burglary scenario was completed on a 
computer. To make the burglary task more meaningful and memorable for 
participants, textboxes were provided that described the different situations and the 
participant was asked to make key decisions throughout the scenario (e.g. ‘What 
kind of product would you like to steal?’ Answer: A: Laptop B: Tablet). 
Furthermore, each option was presented with an advantage and disadvantage that 
was related to an increase or decrease of profit and safety (e.g. for option A: Laptop 
Advantage: very valuable, Disadvantage: big). The chosen options were 
subsequently considered as the ‘truthful’ options during the test procedure later on 
(and thus could differ for each participant). Next, a 5 minutes filler task (short 
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personality questionnaire) was implemented in order to have a break between mock-
crime and lie detection test, because we were concerned that the test’s rationale 
would be too obvious if the test was conducted directly after the mock crime. 
In the innocent condition, participants (truth tellers in the subsequent test) did 
not perform the mock crime, but just the filler task.  
Participants (liars and truth tellers) were then informed that they were 
suspected of a burglary in a police investigation and that they would be submitted to 
a lie detection test. Half of the participants were attached to a fake SCR sensor and 
led to believe that their sweat production during the test would be monitored (the 
other half was not attached to anything nor any information was given). This factor 
is labelled ‘Misdirection’. Participants were told that during the lie detection test 
they would be presented with questions about the burglary and two answer 
alternatives. It was their task to indicate the correct answer and, in case they did not 
know it, guess. 
A total of 23 questions were presented in two steps. First, a question was 
presented. Once read, the participant could move on to a new window, where both 
answer alternatives were presented next to each other horizontally. The horizontal 
alignment was determined randomly. The order in which questions were presented 
was counterbalanced using a latin square of the size 23. 
After the test participants were notified that the lie detection test was over 
and were asked to answer the following questions honestly:  ‘What did you do to 
appear innocent on the test?’ and ‘Did you believe that your sweat was measured 
during the test? (Yes/No)’. The first question was used to determine the strategy each 
participant used. It was directed at the participants actual behaviour instead of 
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conception of strategy to avoid biases introduced by the question, see Schwarz 
(1999).  The latter was used to check whether participants in the Misdirection 
condition were misdirected by the fake SCR sensor. 
Finally, liars were again shown the 23 test questions. Liars were instructed to 
indicate the correct answer, which served as a memory check.  
 
2.3.4 Design 
This study  featured a 2 (Veracity: lie vs. truth) x 2 (Misdirection: yes vs. no) 
between subjects design
2
 with the deviation from chance performance as dependent 
measure. Deviation from chance performance was expressed unidirectionally (only 
underperformance as criterion) and bidirectionally (under- and overperformance as 
criterion). First, we computed the z-score for each participant’s total test score using 
Siegel’s (1956) formula for binomial distributions. Negative scores indicated 
tendencies towards underperformance and positive score towards overperformance. 
These scores were used for unidirectional testing. For bidirectional testing we used 
the absolute version of these scores. In this case the larger a score the more did the 
responses show either under- or overperformance. Z-scores were chosen over raw 
test scores, because they are independent from the total number of questions asked 
and by definition indicate how much the score deviates from the chance distribution.  
Detection accuracy is expressed in terms of sensitivity (, the likelihood that a 
guilty participant is correctly detected), specificity (, the likelihood that an innocent 
participant is correctly detected,) and the Area Under the Curve (AUC), which is the 
general detection accuracy for the entire scale. Sensitivity and specificity require a 
                                                          
2
 The published version claimed to have used a double blind design. This was not the case. 
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specific cut off. However, the choice of cut off is under debate (e.g. Binder, 
Larrabee, & Millis, 2014). For comparison with other deception detection 
experiments we report sensitivity and specificity utilizing the commonly used 5% cut 
off. Scores equal to or smaller than -1.65 unidirectionally and scores larger or equal 
to 1.65 bidirectionally were considered deceptive. 95% confidence intervals were 
provided with square brackets.  
Participants’ strategies were extracted from the open question ‘What did you 
do to appear innocent on the test?’ The primary investigator first read through all 
responses and then classified them into the following eight categories: (1) No 
strategy represents examinees who reported answering the questions honestly or 
reported having no strategy. (2) Avoiding correct information refers to responses that 
indicate that all correct answer alternatives were deliberately avoided. (3) Mixture of 
truth & lies indicates that the participant deliberately included correct and incorrect 
answer in his/her response scheme. (4) Imitating ignorance refers to cases where the 
participant either states to imitate a response pattern of a truth teller or make his/her 
answering pattern look random. (5) Deductive guessing represents answers that 
indicate selecting the most obvious or logical answer. (6) Demeanor refers to cases 
where respondents control their facial expressions or body posture. Finally, (7) 
Physiological countermeasures represents strategies directed at disrupting 
physiological measurements, such as breath control or moving ligaments that were 
attached to the fake SCR sensor. Answers that did not address the question or made 
no sense were indicated as (8) Other and excluded from further analysis. 
A second rater, blind to the hypothesis, classified each participant according 
to these eight categories. If a response would have fitted into more than one 
category, the coder was instructed to choose the one with the best fit. In cases of 
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disagreement both coders discussed the instance and coded the case independent 
from each other again.  Inter-rater reliability was good (73.9% absolute agreement).  
Subsequently, we created a new variable that indicated each strategy level 
according to CHT criteria. We defined three levels (0 – 2). Level 0 strategies (1) 
represent simple compliance with the test instructions. Level 1 strategies (2,6,7) 
represent participants’ reaction to the test instructions or situation (e.g. ‘Avoiding 
correct information’ or ‘Controlling non-verbal behaviour’). Level 2 strategies 
(3,4,5) were defined as reactions to level 1 strategies (e.g. ‘random responding’). 
Inter rate reliability was good (83.7% absolute agreement). 
Two variables were created that described the participants’ beliefs about the 
method underlying the test. The first was a binary indication of whether or not the 
participant understood that too many incorrect answers would identify them as liars. 
Both the primary investigator and a blind rater used the question ‘What did you do to 
appear innocent on the test?’ to make this judgement. In cases of disagreement both 
coders discussed the instance and coded the case independent from each other again. 
Inter-rater reliability was very high (97.8% absolute agreement). The second variable 
indicated whether the participant believed that their physiological responses were 
measured. Participants indicated their response on the question ‘Did you believe that 
your sweat was measured during the test? (Yes/No)’ during the procedure. 
 Lastly, we computed a measure for the memory of event information. The 
memory rating was produced for liars and was the sum of correct answers indicated 
during the memory check at the end. Memory of correct crime information was high 
(mean = 81.66, SD = 10.6).  
2.4 Results 
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2.4.1 Understanding and misdirection 
 First, we examined the effects of our Misdirection manipulation. We 
expected our misdirection condition to decrease the likelihood of understanding the 
true mechanism of the SVT (H4).  
First, we checked whether participants in the misdirection condition did 
actually believe that their physiological responses were measured. Of the 23 liars 
allocated to this condition, 82.6% believed the misdirection, while 95.65% of the 23 
truth tellers allocated to this condition did so, which suggests that our manipulation 
was convincing.  
We then checked whether our misdirection manipulation affected the 
likelihood of a participant to understand the underlying rationale of the lie detection 
test. We found no difference in liars’ ability to discern the test’s mechanism, X2 (1, N 
= 46) = 1.075, p = .299, between Control (35%) and Misdirection (22%) condition. 
For truth tellers the misdirection manipulation greatly reduced the likelihood to 
discover the test’s mechanism: 30.4% of the truth tellers in the control condition 
understood how the test works, whereas nobody in the misdirection condition did, X
2
 
(1, N = 46) = 8.256, p = .014. This supports Hypothesis 4 only partly, as we 
expected both liars and truth tellers to display a decreased likelihood of discerning 
the test’s classification mechanism.  
 
2.4.2 Strategies 
Next, we will give an account of the strategies that participants used and 
explore differences in strategy levels. We expected our Misdirection condition to 
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elicit reports of physiological countermeasures (H5). In terms of strategy levels we 
expected that liars used more sophisticated strategies than truth tellers (H2) and that 
liars’ strategies were more sophisticated than level 0 strategies (H3). Then we will 
address the detection accuracy of the different strategy levels. We expect the test to 
reliably detect level 1 strategies, but not level 2 strategies (H1). 
Table 1 lists the frequencies of strategies broken down by Veracity and 
Misdirection. For truth tellers the most prevalent strategy was to have either no 
strategy or just to be honest (30.4 and 39.1% in the two Misdirection conditions – 
Control and Misdirection –  respectively). Some truth tellers indicated to deliberately 
imitate ignorance (13%) or to pick the most logical answers (Deductive guessing: 
21.7 and 13%). For liars several popular strategies emerged. Avoiding correct 
information (20 and 30.4%), providing a mixture of correct and incorrect answers 
(21.7%) and imitating ignorance (30.4 and 17.4%) were the most popular strategies.  
The Misdirection and control Conditions differed most from each other in a 
strategy that is unique to each condition (for liars and truth tellers alike). In the 
Control condition 17.4% of truth tellers and 8.7% of liars reported controlling their 
demeanor during the test. In contrast in the Misdirection condition around 21.7% of 
the truth tellers and 17.4% of the liars reported countermeasures that were directed 
against our fake SCR sensor (physiological countermeasures). The presence of self-
reported countermeasures against physiological sensors in the Misdirection condition 
supports H5. 
 
Table 2.1 Self reported strategies distinguished between conditions and strategy 
levels. 
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    Truth teller Liar  
Strategy Control Misdirection Control Misdirection  
Level 0          
No strategy 30.4 39.1 4.3 4.3  
Level 1          
Avoid correct information 8.7 - 21.7 30.4  
Demeanor / body language 17.4 - 8.7 -  
Physiological 
countermeasures 
- 21.4 - 17.4  
Level 2          
Imitate ignorance 13 13 30.4 17.4  
Deductive guessing 21.7 13 8.7 4.3  
Mixture of truth & lie - 4.3 21.7 21.7  
             
Other 8.7 8.7 4.3 4.3  
Notes. Frequency of strategies indicated in percentages.  
 
Next
3
, we examined the strategy levels. We conducted a Chi-square test to 
compare the distributions of strategy levels for truth tellers and liars for the standard 
and misdirection condition. In the standard condition liars were more likely to 
exhibit a higher level strategy than truth tellers, X
2
(2, N = 43) = 6.19, p = .045. 
Similarly, in the misdirection condition liars were also more likely to exhibit a 
higher level strategy than truth tellers, X
2
 (2, N = 46) = 9.16, p = .010. These findings 
support H2. In addition we looked at the actual prevalence of strategy levels for each 
                                                          
3
 These analyses differ from the published version. Originally, we conducted a 2x2 ANOVA and a 
number of one-sample t-tests. The conclusions drawn did not change. 
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group. Liars in the standard condition (level 0 = 4.5%; level 1 = 31.8%; level 2 = 
63.6%) and misdirection condition (level 0 = 4.5%; level 1 = 50%; level 2 = 45.5%) 
display primarily level 1 and level 2 strategies. Level 0 strategies occur only rarely. 
Truth tellers in the standard condition (level 0 = 33.3%; level 1 = 28.6%; level 2 = 
38.1%) and misdirection condition (level 0 = 42.9%; level 1 = 23.8%; level 2 = 
33.3%) displayed much higher frequencies of level 0 strategies, but in contrast to our 
expectations they also displayed level 1 and level 2 strategies. In fact the we found 
that only less than half of our truth tellers followed a level 0 strategy. Therefore, H3 
is only partly supported. 
In Table 2 the percentage of detected and undetected liars is displayed for the 
Control and Misdirection condition. Due to the fact that only two observations were 
available for level 0 strategies we forfeited any interpretation. For level 1 strategies 
we found a high detection rate in our Control (around 85%) and Misdirection 
condition (around 72%). For level 2 strategies we found the same results in both 
conditions, half of the liars who used level 2 strategies were detected. In line with 
Hypothesis 1 we found a high detection rate of level 1 strategies in liars. Contrary to 
our expectations half of the liars with level 2 strategies were also detected. Thus, H1 
is only partly supported. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Number of detected and undetected strategies differentiated by level for 
Liars in the Control condition (unidirectional) and Misdirection condition 
(bidirectional). 
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 Strategy level N Detected Undetected 
Control     
 0 1 0 100 
 1 7 85.7 14.3 
 2 14 50 50 
Misdirection     
 0 1 100 0 
 1 11 72.7 27.3 
 2 10 50 50 
Notes. Detection accuracy indicated in percentages. 
 
 To follow up we examined in particular which level 2 strategies of liars 
exactly were detected and which remained undetected. Table 3 displays these 
frequencies for the Control and Misdirection condition together, as both showed 
almost the same pattern. As Table 3 shows, each of three level 2 strategies was as 
frequently detected as it remained undetected. In addition we looked into the 
individual z-scores of these participants. A considerable proportion (33.33%) of 
detected liars using level two strategies had just enough answers wrong to be 
detected. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Frequency of liars’ level 2 strategies 
Strategy Detected Undetected 
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Imitate ignorance 6 5 
Deductive guessing 1 2 
Mixture of truth & lie 5 5 
Notes. Control (unidirectional) and Misdirection (bidirectional) conditions combined as they had 
similar distributions of strategies. 
 
2.4.3 Avoidance behaviour and detection accuracy 
Lastly, we examined the detection accuracy. We expected to find greater 
overperformance in the Misdirection condition (H6; overperformance is incorporated 
in the bidirectional criterion). 
In Table 4 we summarize the detection parameters for the Control and 
Misdirection condition for both uni- and bidirectional avoidance behaviour. 
Sensitivity and specificity are high in every case. The traditional approach (Control – 
unidirectionally) obtained a sensitivity of 56.52% and a specificity of 86.95%. With 
a bidirectional decision criterion we achieved even higher sensitivity (65.22%) and 
specificity (95.65%) in the Misdirection condition utilizing the bidirectional 
criterion.  In terms of generalized detection efficiency uni- (AUC = .76, p = .002) and 
bidirectional (AUC = .72, p = .011) classification was significantly better than 
chance in the Control condition. In the Misdirection condition, only the bidirectional 
(AUC = .82, p < .001), but not the unidirectional (AUC = .67, p = .055), measure 
provided better discriminative ability than chance. This supports H6, as only the 
bidirectional criterion (includes overperformance) and not the unidirectional criterion 
was significantly better than chance performance.  
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Finally, we examined what strategies were used by liars in the Misdirection 
condition exhibiting overperformance. Of the five cases of overperformance, the 
categories ‘No Strategy’ and ‘Mixture of truth & lie’ were reported by one 
participant and three reported performing ‘Physiological countermeasures’. 
Table 2.4 Classification Accuracy 
  Sensitivity Specificity AUC 95% CI 
Control        
Unidirectional 56.52 86.95 .76
*
 .62 - .90 
Bidirectional 60.87 86.95 .72
*
  .56 - .88 
Misdirection        
Unidirectional 43.5 100 .67 .49 - .84 
Bidirectional 65.22 95.65 .82
*
  .69 - .95 
Notes. * p < .05. Cutoff for sensitivity and specificity at p = .05 
 
2.5 Discussion 
The aims of this study were twofold. First we attempted to theoretically 
conceptualize forced choice memory performance testing in terms of strategy 
selection processes. We defined strategy selection in terms of Cognitive Hierarchy 
Theory (Carmerer et al., 2004). Key concepts of CHT involve differentiation 
between levels of strategies through the degree of anticipation for opponents’ 
strategies and the limitations imposed by individual cognitive capacities in the 
strategy selection process. Second, we investigated the malleability of the strategy 
selection process: Through a misdirection of reason (Kuhn et al., 2014) we attempted 
to elicit cases of overperformance in liars. 
49 
 
Relative to previous studies (Giger et al., 2010; Jelicic et al., 2004; Meijer et 
al., 2007; Merckelbach et al., 2002; & Shaw et al., 2012) we found a high detection 
accuracy for liars (56.20 – 65.22%) and slightly lower than average (86.95%) to 
excellent (95.65%) specificity. Our specificity falls within the range of previous 
studies (Giger et al., 2010; Meijer et al., 2007; & Shaw et al., 2012). Small 
fluctuations are to be expected, as these groups represent actual chance performance, 
which means that a priori defined specificities will be approached with increases of 
sample size. Additionally, AUC indicated a good general detection accuracy in the 
Control (unidirectionally AUC = .76) and Misdirection condition (bidirectional AUC 
= .82). When differentiating strategy levels, we found that liars using level 1 
strategies were well detected by the test (72.7 – 85.7%), but the findings for liars 
using level 2 strategies were less straightforward. Contrary to our expectation half of 
the liars who used level 2 strategies were detected. Predictive validity of level 1 
strategies is good, but not for level 2 strategies. We suggest the following sources of 
error that may aid in explaining the error in prediction (for both level 1 and level 2 
strategies). Fist, to execute a strategy the participant needs to recognize the correct 
answer on each trial. Although memory performance was good, it was not perfect. 
That means participants either had to guess or selected, from their perspective, an 
unintended answer on trials for which they did not remember the correct answer. 
These errors can easily artificially inflate test scores for level 1 users. Second, we 
performed our estimates based on strategy levels and not individual strategies. The 
problem is that not every strategy per level necessarily produces the same test 
response. Some level 1 strategies (e.g. Demeanor) do not refer to test scores at all, 
while others do (e.g. ‘Avoid correct information’). There are also two potential 
sources of error for level 2 strategies. First, the concept of level of chance may be 
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hard to grasp. We noted that a considerable proportion (33.33%) of detected liars, 
who utilized level two strategies, just passed the detection threshold by one answer. 
In other words, participants may have been unable to correctly determine how many 
correct answers were necessary to remain within chance levels. Second, we 
considered the entire test performance as a representation of the reported strategy. 
However, we are unable to determine the exact moment a strategy was implemented 
or whether a strategy change took place. Devising or changing to a level 2 strategy 
during the test may be to late to implement it correctly. Finally, both of these sources 
of error are further strengthened by the fact that total number of test items was 
unknown. 
Despite this imperfect relationship between strategy level and classification 
rate, we argue that strategy selection provides a better theoretical construct for 
behaviour in a forced choice memory performance testing than pure avoidance 
motivation. So far the latter has simply been assumed, and it can only reasonably 
explain cases wherein the liar was detected, which is often less than 50% of the data. 
Strategy selection is supported by the fact that liars in our (and in Shaw et al., 2012) 
study report using different strategies. These can be conceptualized within a CHT 
(Carmerer et al., 2004) framework and we also found average strategy levels for liars 
(Control = 1.59 & Misdirection = 1.41) similar to studies Carmerer et al. (2004) refer 
to. Although imperfect, strategy selection has at least the same predictive validity as 
pure avoidance motivation. In addition, it enables predictions for detected and 
undetected cases and has identifiable sources of error.  
Regarding the Misdirection manipulation, by presenting the test situation as a 
polygraph examination, we were able to reduce the likelihood to realise the test’s 
true mechanism in truth tellers, 30.4% in the Control condition understood the test, 
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but none in the Misdirection condition. This was not the case for liars (Control: 35% 
and Misdirection: 22%). Additionally, our misdirection led liars (17.4%) and truth 
tellers (21.7%) to report using physiological countermeasures as their strategy to 
defeat the test. Although our misdirection did not lower the likelihood for liars to see 
through the test’s mechanism we still found that a considerable proportion reported 
physiological countermeasures as their strategy. These findings may seem at odds 
with each other, but a potential explanation could be that only participants fell for the 
misdirection, who would not have understood the test in the first place. 
In terms of test scores we found an increased presence of overperformance in 
the Misdirection condition. This can be seen in the difference between the uni- and 
bidirectional criteria, as the latter only improves detection accuracy in the presence 
of overperformance. In the Control condition we found that both the unidirectional 
(AUC = .76) and the bidirectional (AUC = .72) criterion discriminated truth tellers 
from liars. This was not the case in the Misdirection condition. Here, only the 
bidirectional criterion (AUC = .82) proved better than chance. This suggests that by 
manipulating the information content the test situation provides test behaviour can be 
shaped accordingly. 
There are two limitations we would like to address. First, in deception 
detection experiments the mock crime procedure is often criticised for not being 
realistic enough. We argue that this is not the case here. In forced choice memory 
testing only one element of a mock crime matters: That it induces the memory of 
details later encountered in the test. We have measured memorability and consider it 
high.  
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Second, we used self reported data to measure the strategies participants 
used. The validity of self reported data has been subject to discussion (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Ericsson, & Simon, 1980), raising the question whether participants 
can know, in this case, what kind of strategy they actually used. Ericsson & Simon 
(1980) show that self reported information is reliable if it has been subject to focal 
attention and at least been in the short term memory. In other words the participant 
must have been aware of the information to verbalize. Our analyses are based on the 
strategy levels. This categorization can be reduced to the belief a participant held 
over the test’s mechanism. This information was accessible to participants and 
therefore can be used.  
From a theoretical point of view this study proposes a new perspective on the 
psychological processes involved in forced choice memory performance testing. We 
argue that examinees design a strategy to defeat the test and that their strategy 
selection process can be influenced by managing the information content of the test 
situation. This study shows that new behaviours can be elicited by drawing on the 
particular strategy selection process made by examinees, in this case 
overperformance, through a misdirection of reason. 
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Chapter 3: 
Effects of Time Pressure on Strategy Selection and Strategy 
Execution in Forced Choice Testing 
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of Time Pressure on Strategy Selection and Strategy Execution in Forced 
Choice Testing 
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3.1 Abstract 
We investigated the effects of cognitive load on the detection accuracy and 
development of counter strategies of examinees with concealed knowledge in the 
Forced Choice Test (FCT). Specifically, we hypothesized that cognitive load would 
force participants to develop less effective counter strategies, leading to an increase 
in detection accuracy. We subjected 120 participants with or without concealed 
knowledge to either a standard FCT or a FCT under cognitive load. Cognitive load 
was induced through time pressure. In both conditions examinees with concealed 
knowledge were detected better than chance and the best detection accuracy was 
found in the cognitive load condition. Furthermore, cognitive load did not lower the 
incident rate of effective counter strategies, but a closer look at the data suggests that 
instead their success rates were reduced. Further disambiguation of the effects of 
cognitive load and disentanglement between strategy selection and execution is 
needed. 
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3.2 Introduction 
The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be applied to detect concealed knowledge 
about an event (Denney, 1996; Pankratz, 1983). In a FCT, the examinees are 
presented with questions about the event, two possible answer alternatives, and the 
instruction to select the correct answer alternatives or to guess in case they don’t 
know. While examinees who are unaware of the correct answer have no choice other 
than to guess, examinees who try to conceal their knowledge tend to purposefully 
select incorrect answers. Therefore, test scores fall below chance levels – so called 
underperformance – and can be used as detection criterion (Bianchini, Mathias, & 
Greve, 2001; Van Oorsouw, & Merckelbach, 2010). 
Empirical research suggests that examinees with concealed knowledge can 
successfully be detected at rates varying from 40% to 60% (Giger, Merten, 
Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, 2004; Meijer, 
Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; 
Orthey, Vrij, Leal, & Blank, 2017; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2012). This 
detection accuracy is directly related to the prevalence of three different self-reported 
response patterns that examinees with concealed knowledge use to avoid being 
detected by the test (Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey, Vrij, Meijer, Leal, & Blank, 2018). 
These response patterns are defined in terms of hierarchical strategy levels and 
specify how answer alternatives are selected depending on the examinees beliefs 
about the test’s detection mechanism (Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). 
Examinees using level 0 strategies form no belief about the test’s detection 
mechanism and comply with the test instructions to select the correct answer 
alternatives. Examinees using level 1 strategies assume the test’s detection 
mechanism is based on a level 0 strategy and their response pattern is a reaction to 
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the test instructions. Instead of selecting the correct answers, examinees select the 
incorrect answers. Examinees using level 2 strategies assume the test uses a level 1 
strategy as detection mechanism and provide a mixture of correct and incorrect 
answers as response pattern instead. Although, each strategy level predicts different 
behaviour the intended objective is the same, namely to avoid detection by the FCT. 
In a FCT, levels 1 and 2 are the most prevalent strategy levels with roughly equal 
frequencies; level 0 strategies rarely occur in examinees with concealed knowledge. 
Consequently, the underperformance criterion used to detect concealed knowledge in 
a FCT is apt at detecting level 1 strategies, but does not detect level 2 strategies. 
Therefore, in theory, detection accuracy could be increased by manipulations that 
shift the participant’s strategy from level 2 to level 1. 
The three strategy levels were derived from Cognitive Hierarchy Theory 
(CHT; see Carmerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004). From this theory it follows that 
limitations in cognitive resources affect the strategy selection. As such, the strategy 
an examinee selects is not necessarily the optimal strategy, but, rather a strategy that 
is ‘good enough’ given the available cognitive resources (also known as satisficing; 
see Simon, 1955).Previous research indicates that a large proportion of examinees 
have sufficient cognitive resources available to discern the test’s mechanism and to 
devise an appropriate counter strategy (see Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). 
Thus, if one could limit the cognitive resources available to examinees, this would 
reduce the frequency of higher order strategies (e.g. level 2). As a consequence the 
detection accuracy of the FCT would increase, because more examinees would be 
forced to employ a level 1 strategy instead.  
It is generally accepted that humans have a limited amount of cognitive 
resources available at any given moment. Therefore, increasing cognitive load limits 
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these available resources (Plass, Moreno, & Brunken, 2010). We chose to implement 
cognitive load through time pressure, as it is a commonly used manipulation for 
cognitive load (see Klapproth, 2008) and it can easily be introduced into the FCT 
paradigm. Hence, we subjected examinees to a mock crime procedure or a filler task 
followed by either a standard FCT or a FCT with the restriction that each question 
has to be answered within two seconds. We tested two hypotheses:  Under time 
pressure, examinees will be more likely to report using lower level strategies ( e.g. 
level 1 instead of level 2, or level 0 instead of level 1) than under standard conditions 
(Hypothesis 1). As a consequence, examinees with concealed knowledge will display 
more extreme (positive or negative) test scores, resulting in increased classification 
accuracy of the FCT (Hypothesis 2). 
 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
 We tested 120 participants (33 males, 87 females) from the university 
undergraduate population of Bergamo University. Their mean age was M = 24.61 
(SD = 7.31). Ethical approval was obtained.  
 
3.3.2 Procedure 
 Examinees were randomly assigned to one of two Virtual Reality scenarios. 
In both scenarios examinees were placed in a virtual apartment that could be freely 
explored from the first person perspective. In the concealed knowledge conditions 
examinees were told that they were to investigate the apartment of a terrorist and had 
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to obtain as much information as possible about the terrorist and his planned actions. 
The apartment contained clues that could be investigated further. These clues were 
easily visible. Examinees could examine them further by clicking on them. This 
provided them with a more detailed picture and short description of the clue. Once 
all clues were examined the simulation terminated and examinees were instructed 
not to reveal the knowledge gained from the simulation for the remainder of the 
experiment. In the no concealed knowledge condition, examinees were instructed to 
survey a different apartment and instructed to remember as much details as possible. 
This simulation terminated after three minutes.  
 Then, all examinees were subjected to a FCT examination about the terrorist 
apartment. The test was computerized and examinees were randomly assigned to 
either the standard or time pressure condition. In the standard conditions, examinees 
received 20 questions about the terrorist apartment and each question featured two 
possible answer alternatives. Questions were presented in two steps. First the 
question was displayed in the centre of the screen. Upon clicking the ‘next’ button at 
the bottom centre of the screen the question disappeared and the two answer 
alternatives were presented at the top left/right side. All answer alternatives were 
pictures and examinees could select an answer by clicking on it with a mouse button. 
Examinees received the following instructions: ‘Next, you will be presented with a 
number of questions and two answer alternatives per question. Select the correct 
answer. If you don’t know, guess.’ Examinees in the time pressure condition 
received the additional instruction: ‘You have to choose an answer alternative for 
each question within two seconds, otherwise the trial will time-out. If you time-out 
too often you fail the test automatically. In case an examinee took longer than two 
seconds a buzzer sound occurred to signal the time-out. 
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 After the FCT procedure, examinees were instructed that the deception 
detection task was over and that they should answer the following questions 
honestly. They were asked: ‘What did you do to avoid being classified as a liar by 
the previous test?’. Their answers were recorded, transcribed, and coded by two 
independent coders.  
 Finally, examinees with concealed knowledge received the 20 FCT questions 
and answer alternatives again and were tasked to indicate the correct answer 
alternative they remembered from the simulation. This served as a memory check 
and memory performance was good (91.17%).  
 
3.3.3 Materials 
 We used the same Virtual Reality simulations, FCT questions and answer 
alternatives as in Orthey et al. (2018). The answer alternatives of all questions were 
validated to be equally plausible (see Doob & Kirschenbaum, 1973). In total the FCT 
contained 20 questions with 2 answer alternatives each. Answer alternatives were 
presented pictorially and had the same size. To control for order effects, the 
sequence of questions was counterbalanced across examinees, using a latin square of 
the size 20. Therefore, the 20 questions occurred equally often over all possible trials 
(1 – 20). The horizontal alignment of the correct answer alternative was determined 
randomly on each trial.  
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3.3.4 Design 
 This experiment featured a 2 Veracity (concealed knowledge vs no concealed 
knowledge) x 2 Cognitive load (standard vs time pressure) between-subjects design 
with the test scores as dependent variable. Test scores were computed by submitting 
the raw total number of correct answer alternatives selected to a z-transformation 
according to the binomial distribution (see Siegel, & Castellan, 1988, p. 43). The 
higher/smaller a z-score was, the less likely it was to occur due to chance and smaller 
scores were indicative of underperformance. Detection accuracy was estimated using 
the Area Under the Curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC; 
see Tanner, & Swets, 1954; Hanley & McNeil, 1982). An ROC plots the sensitivity 
(detection rate of the signal) against specificity (detection rate for noise) for each 
possible cut off. The AUC indicates the general diagnostic value for all possible cut-
offs. An AUC ranges from 0 to 1 and 0.5 refers to chance performance. AUCs larger 
than 0.5 suggest that the criterion detects the signal better than chance. In addition, 
we categorized FCT z-scores into under-, chance-, and overperformance. We 
handled the traditional 5% cut-off (bidirectional; z-scores larger than 1.96 for 
overperformance, or lower than -1.96 for underperformance) for classification. 
 Examinees reaction time was measured in two ways. On each trial reaction 
time was measured from the time the two answer alternatives were presented up to 
the time participants selected an answer alternative. First, we computed the average 
reaction time over all trials per participants. Second, we counted the number of times 
participants exceeded the two second threshold in the time pressure condition. These 
measures were used as a manipulation check. Examinees’ responses to the 
open ended question were coded into distinct strategy levels (0, 1, and 2) (see Orthey 
et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). These strategy levels define the selection strategy 
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of the examinee based on their belief over the tests’ detection mechanism. Level 0 
strategies form no belief over the detection mechanism and comply with the test 
instructions to select the correct answer alternatives. Hence, level 0 strategies would 
result in overperformance. Level 1 strategies operate on the belief that the test 
identifies concealed knowledge through complying with the test instructions and 
therefore, feature a reaction to them, such as picking the incorrect answers instead. 
Employing level 1 strategies would result in underperformance. Finally, level 2 
strategies follow from the understanding that the test detects concealed knowledge 
through underperformance. Consequently, level 2 strategies feature behaviours with 
the goal to provide a mixture of correct and incorrect answers, resulting in test scores 
that fall within chance performance.  
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1. Reaction time 
A 2 Veracity  (concealed knowledge vs no concealed knowledge) x 2 
Cognitive Load (standard vs time pressure) between subjects ANOVA with average 
reaction time as dependent variable was conducted to assess the effectiveness of our 
time pressure manipulation. We found a significant difference for Veracity, F(1,116) 
= 18.91, p < .001, η2 = .14. Examinees without concealed knowledge (mean = 4.99, 
SD = 4.58) took longer than those with concealed knowledge (mean = 2.92, SD = 
2.43). We also found a significant effect for cognitive load, F(1,116) = 108.92. p < 
.001, η2 = .48. Examinees in the standard condition (mean = 6.43, SD = 3.99) took 
longer than examinees in the time pressure condition (mean = 1.48, SD = 0.81). 
There was also a significant Veracity x Cognitive load interaction, F(1, 116) = 11.11, 
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p = .001, η2 = .09. The difference between examinees with and without concealed 
knowledge was larger in the standard condition (Concealed knowledge: mean = 4.61, 
SD = 2.47; No concealed knowledge: mean = 8.25, SD = 4.42) than in the time 
pressure condition (Concealed knowledge: mean = 1.25, SD = 0.22; No concealed 
knowledge: mean = 1.73, SD = 1.09). Furthermore, we looked into the number of 
times participants timed out (i.e. a response time longer than two seconds) in the 
time pressure condition. Examinees with concealed knowledge timed out on average 
1.03 (SD = 0.99) times, and examinees without concealed knowledge timed out on 
average 4.07 (SD = 4.52) times. In sum, we conclude that our time pressure 
manipulation was effective. 
3.4.2 Strategy levels 
First, we examined the strategy levels of examinees with concealed 
knowledge. In both the standard and time pressure conditions, level 1 strategies were 
the most prevalent (Standard = 48%; Time pressure = 62%) followed by level 2 
strategies (Standard = 33%; Time pressure = 28%) and level 0 strategies (Standard = 
19%; Time pressure = 10%). A Chi-square test of independence was calculated 
comparing the frequency of the strategy levels between standard and time pressure 
condition. We found that the frequency of the different strategy levels did not differ 
between conditions, Χ2 (2, N = 56) = 1.30, p = .523. The finding that time pressure 
did not lead to a shift to lower level strategies means Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
 
3.4.3 Test Scores 
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 The test scores detected concealed knowledge better than chance in both the 
standard and time pressure conditions (see Table 1). Detection accuracy in the 
standard condition was AUC = .66, p = .034, 95% CI = [.50 .82], and detection 
accuracy in the time pressure condition was AUC = .80, p = < .001, 95% CI = [.67 
.93].  
Table 3.1 Detection accuracy of total scores per condition 
 Condition  AUC    p 95% CI 
Total scores        
 Standard .66     .034 [.50 .82] 
 Time pressure .80 < .001 [.67 .93] 
Notes. Lower scores indicate concealed knowledge.  
 
To assess the effects of time pressure on the test scores we compared 
examinees with concealed knowledge between conditions per strategy levels. First 
we categorized the test scores into under-, over-, and chance performance. Table 2 
displays the proportions for each strategy level. For level 0 and 1 strategies, the 
distributions of test scores were similar. For the examinees using level 2 strategies, 
in the standard condition 89% fell within chance performance with only 11% 
showing underperformance. In the time pressure condition only 37.5% fell within 
chance performance with 50% displaying below chance level performance. Time 
pressure seemed to affect only one strategy level, so we tested whether scores 
outside chance performance (under- and overperformance combined) were more 
likely to occur under time pressure for level 2 strategies. A chi-square test revealed a 
significant effect, Χ2 (1) = 4.90, p = 0.27, test scores outside chance performance 
occurred more frequently under time pressure.  Additionally, we conducted an 
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independent samples t-test on the absolute test scores, because not all assumptions of 
the Chi squared test were met. Examinees using level 2 strategies had higher test 
scores in the time pressure condition (M = 1.90, SD = 0.62), than in the standard 
condition (M = 0.77, SD = 0.69), t(15) = -3.50, p = .003. Altogether, this supports 
our second hypothesis that test scores become more extreme under time pressure 
although only for examinees using level 2 strategies. 
Table 3.2 Percentage of total scores per strategy level categorized into Under-, 
Chance-, and Overperformance for examinees with concealed knowledge. 
 Condition  Underperformance Chance 
performance 
Overperformance N 
Level 0        
 Standard 20% 0% 80% 5 
 Time Pressure 33% 0% 66% 3 
Level 1        
 Standard 100% 0% 0% 13 
 Time Pressure 78% 11% 11% 18 
Level 2        
 Standard 11% 89% 0% 9 
 Time Pressure 50% 37.5% 12.5% 8 
Notes. Scores were categorized as follows: Underperformance: x <= -1.96; Overperformance: x >= 
1.96; Chance performance: -1.96 < x < 1.96. Examinees that could not be categorized in any of these 
strategy levels. Three were excluded in the Standard condition and one in the Time pressure 
condition. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
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We subjected examinees with and without concealed knowledge to a standard 
FCT or a modified FCT that forced examinees to respond within two seconds for 
each question. We introduced time pressure to the FCT paradigm to elicit cognitive 
load, which we expected would lead examinees with concealed knowledge to be 
more likely to select lower level strategies, and hence increase the detection accuracy 
of the FCT. 
Time pressure did not affect strategy selection. The frequencies of the 
strategy levels between our standard and time pressure conditions did not differ and 
matched those found in other experiments (see Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 
2018). Yet, time pressure did lead to significantly more extreme test scores in 
examinees with concealed knowledge who used level 2 strategies. When categorized 
into under-, chance-, and over-performance, more than half of those examinees fell 
outside the chance performance category and only a minority managed to achieve 
chance performance (around 37%). This stands in sharp contrast with findings in our 
control condition and previous research (see Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018), 
where most examinees who reported to have randomized their answers achieved test 
scores that fall within chance performance. Thus, even though time pressure did not 
affect the strategy examinees with concealed knowledge reported to have used, it did 
affect their ability to successfully execute these strategies.  
In terms of overall detection accuracy, both the traditional FCT and the time 
pressure FCT detected concealed knowledge better than chance. The standard 
condition had a detection accuracy close to 0.70, which is within the range of 
previous research (Meijer et al., 2007; Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018). By 
comparison, the time pressure condition featured one of the best detection accuracies 
found so far, around 0.80. A likely reason for this is the reduced success-rate of level 
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2 strategies, resulting in more extreme test scores that are detected by the 
underperformance criterion. This implies that detection accuracy could additionally 
be increased by making effective counterstrategies harder to perform successfully.  
From a theoretical point of view, these findings suggest that strategy 
selection is not the only component affecting the test score. In addition, examinees 
ability to successfully execute their intended strategy plays a role.  In this case, time 
pressure led examinees following a level 2 strategy to produce more extreme test 
scores than those not under time pressure. Other, lower level strategies were not 
affected, likely because they are easier to execute (i.e. either selecting only correct or 
only incorrect answers). That means the influence of cognitive load must be 
differentiated between affecting the strategy selection or strategy execution. Further 
disambiguation between strategy selection, the intended test outcome, and strategy 
execution, the actual test outcome, is needed, especially in light of various 
implementations of cognitive load. 
Future research on the strategy selection could focus more on making it 
harder to discern the test’s detection mechanism through misdirection (see Kuhn, 
Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014). For example, by adding a fake polygraph to 
the set up of the FCT procedure in order to make examinees believe their 
physiological responses were recorded during the test. As a consequence, more 
examinees complied with the test instructions to select the correct answer 
alternatives (lowest level strategy) with the polygraph setup than in the control group 
(see Orthey et al., 2017). In a similar manner, other, more salient forms of 
misdirection could be used to shape examinees’ strategy selection process. 
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In sum, although time pressure did not affect the strategy selection of 
examinees with concealed knowledge, it did affect the execution of their chosen 
strategy, resulting in lower success rates of level 2 strategies. As such, time pressure 
provides an easy to implement adjustment to the FCT that will likely increase its 
detection accuracy. 
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4.1 Abstract
4
 
The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used to detect malingered loss of memory for 
specific events in the legal arena. However, empirical evidence suggests that 
coaching, informing the examinee about the test’s mechanism, leads to a shift in 
malingerers’ response strategies towards intentional randomization between correct 
and incorrect answers. Here we examine the validity of the runs test, alternations 
between correct and incorrect answers, as a criterion for malingering. 104 
participants either performed a mock crime scenario or a filler task. Then 
participants were coached about the FCT’s test mechanics or not and subjected to a 
FCT. The FCT used here was designed to differentiate response patterns that appear 
random with those that fall within levels of chance, by manipulating the horizontal 
position of the correct answer alternative on each trial. Coaching lead malingerers to 
adopt the intentional randomization response strategy, and malingerers were detected 
better than chance by the runs test. Malingerers, who received no coaching, were 
well detected by the traditional underperformance criterion and a two-step 
classification process of both criteria lead to incremental validity. 
  
                                                          
4
 This abstract differs from the published version. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Forced choice testing (FCT) has been used as a test to detect malingering of 
sensory impairment (Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975). More recently, it’s use has 
been extended to detect cases of faked memory loss (e.g., Denney, 1996; Hiscock & 
Hiscock, 1989; Pankratz, 1983; Van Oorsouw, & Merckelbach, 2010) and concealed 
information (e.g., Giger, Merten, Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; Meijer, Smulders, 
Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007; Orthey, Vrij, Leal, & Blank, 2017; Shaw, Vrij, 
Mann, Leal & Hillman, 2012), from which guilty knowledge can be inferred. In the 
case of concealed information detection, a typical test works as follows:  A suspect is 
presented with a series of questions about the crime. With each question, two equally 
plausible answer alternatives are presented; a correct and an incorrect one. For 
example a question such as “What was the murder weapon” could be accompanied 
with two answer alternatives such as “gun” and “knife”. Suspects are instructed to 
select the correct answer, or guess if they don’t know. Innocent suspects – who have 
no knowledge of the correct answers – will have to guess on each trial, and thereby 
choose correct answer alternatives as predicted by chance. Guilty suspects, in 
contrast, know which of the two alternatives is correct. To conceal this guilty 
knowledge, they are inclined to purposefully select the incorrect answers, leading to 
underperformance, i.e., the frequency with which the correct option is chosen is 
below chance level. Consequently, hidden knowledge is inferred from 
underperformance. 
Previous studies have shown that FCTs have good detection rates for 
innocent examinees, specificity. However, the detection rate for guilty examinees, 
sensitivity, is modest at best. More specifically, with a specificity ranging around 
95%, sensitivity ranges from 40% to 65% (Giger et al., 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, 
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& van Bergen, 2004; Meijer et al., 2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; Shaw 
et al., 2012). These validity estimates are, however, for participants who are 
unfamiliar with the test’s underlying rationale. Verschuere, Meijer, and Crombez 
(2008) showed that sensitivity is reduced considerably when participants have been 
informed about this rationale (i.e. coached). These authors coached half of their 
participants, and then submitted both naïve and coached participants to a forced 
choice performance test about autobiographical details. They were able to classify 
58% of the naïve liars, but none of the coached liars when using underperformance 
(i.e., the number of correct items selected) as the criterion. Consequently, the authors 
conclude that forced choice performance testing is not resistant to coaching. 
 The finding that coached participants beat the ‘correct total’ criterion (i.e. 
choosing the incorrect item more often than predicted by chance) fits with the 
strategy description provided by Orthey, Vrij, Leal, and Blank (2017). These authors 
proposed that test behaviour is governed by specific strategies, and that these 
strategies can be categorized into different levels in accordance with Cognitive 
Hierarchy Theory (CHT; Carmerer, Ho, & Chong 2004). In CHT, a strategy level 
indicates the degree to which it anticipates any opponent’s strategy. In terms of 
forced choice performance testing, the test is considered the opponent and the 
suspect the strategist. In particular, Orthey et al. (2017) specified three strategy 
levels. A guilty suspect who does not anticipate anything from the test and complies 
with the test instructions (‘Select the correct answer, if you don’t know, guess.’) 
carries out a level 0 strategy. A guilty participant who assumes the test uses a level 0 
strategy (i.e., compliance with test instructions) for detection therefore includes a 
reaction to this assumed detection strategy and executes a level 1 strategy. The most 
obvious reaction is to avoid correct information, which leads to underperformance 
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typically seen in a substantial proportion of guilty participants. Finally, a participant 
who assumes the test uses a level 1 strategy (such as detection through 
underperformance) will use a level 2 strategy, i.e. attempt to calibrate performance 
within chance level. From this follows that underperformance as a detection criterion 
is only suitable for detecting participants who use a level 1 strategy. Coaching 
participants by warning them not to underperform, should elicit higher-level 
strategies, such as deliberate randomization.  
 All three strategy levels occur naturally in naïve guilty examinees. Orthey et 
al. (2017) found level 2 strategies to be the most prevalent and used by around 50% 
of their sample. This was followed by level 1 strategies, used by around 45%. Level 
0 strategies were the least prevalent and occurred rarely (around 5%). Additionally, 
these authors linked the prevalence of strategy levels to the detection accuracy cap of 
the test. The total score criterion was apt at detecting underperformance in level 1 
strategies, but was not designed to detect either level 0 or level 2 strategies. This 
shows that the detection accuracy of the test is limited to the prevalence of detectable 
strategies and that detection accuracy can be increased by also detecting other 
strategies. 
 Using a level 2 strategy means that examinees will attempt to produce a 
random sequences of correct and incorrect answers to pass the test. Yet, the correct 
total criterion is not the only criterion of randomness. Another criterion is the 
alternation rate. For example the sequence of CORRECT CORRECT CORRECT 
INCORRECT INCORRECT INCORRECT contains one alternation. The sequence 
of CORRECT INCORRECT CORRECT INCORRECT CORRECT INCORRECT 
contains 5 alternations. Innocent examinees alternate between correct and incorrect 
answers on subsequent trials at a rate of 50%. Yet it is not the case for guilty 
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examinees. There is strong evidence suggesting that humans cannot properly 
reproduce randomness. When asked to generate a random response pattern, humans 
were found to utilize higher alternation rates than expected from true randomness 
(Nickerson, 2002; Wagenaar, 1972). Multiple estimates suggest that human random 
responding features an alternation rate of 60% as opposed to randomness’s 
alternation rate of 50% (see Falk & Konold, 1997). In other words, an attempted 
random mixture of correct and incorrect answers can be expected to exhibit more 
alternations than a genuine random response pattern. 
 Indeed, the number of alternations between correct and incorrect has been 
used to detect coached participants, but with limited success. Verschuere et al. 
(2008) only identified 21% coached liars. Similarly, Jelicic et al., (2004) – tested the 
number of alternations in those participants who indicated randomization as their 
strategy. In their sample not a single liar was identified using this test.  
 A potential reason for this poor detection accuracy might lie in that – as 
outline above – the difference between genuine randomness (50% alternation rate) 
and attempted random responding (around 60% alternation rate; see Falk & Konold, 
1997), is relatively small. Such a small difference requires a large test-size (i.e., 
number of items or questions) to become significant, and test-sizes in Verschuere et 
al. (2008) and Jelicic et al. (2004) may simply have been too small to detect the 
difference between a deliberate and random mix of answer alternatives.  
In real life, including many items in forced choice performance deception 
detection tests may not always be feasible. The event may, for example not have 
enough details the investigators can verify and are exclusively known to the 
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perpetrator (Podlesney, 2003). If constructing large tests is not possible, another way 
to enhance detection accuracy is needed.  
 In this experiment we attempted to increase the diagnostic accuracy of the 
FCT procedure without requiring additional questions. Traditionally, each question 
in a forced choice test is presented with two answer alternatives. The position of the 
correct answer alternative (e.g., left or right) is determined randomly for each trial. 
In the current experiment, we alternate the position of the correct answer alternative 
between trials. On the first trial the horizontal position of the correct answer 
alternative would be determined randomly, for example on the right. On every 
subsequent trial the correct answer alternative would be presented on the opposite 
side of the previous trial. This way of presenting the answer alternatives allows for 
two types of randomized response patterns: Guilty examinees can randomize 
horizontally, alternating between left and right answer alternatives (which will look 
like a random response pattern), or between correct and incorrect answer alternatives 
(which produces a total score that falls within chance performance). In our design, 
correct/incorrect and horizontal alternations become negatively correlated. A high 
number of correct/incorrect alternations is associated with a low number of 
horizontal alternations and vice versa (e.g., always choosing the option presented on 
the left results in the maximum number of correct/incorrect alternations as well as 
the lowest number of horizontal alternations). Our idea behind this manipulation is 
as follows: innocent participants – whether naïve or coached – are unaware of which 
of the answer alternatives is correct, and will choose to randomize horizontally. As a 
consequence they will show a high number of horizontal alternations, corresponding 
to a low number of correct/incorrect alternations. Coached guilty participants are 
expected to employ level 2 strategies and are faced with having to choose between 
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producing a sequence that looks ‘random’ (high frequency of horizontal alternations) 
or producing a sequence where the correct total criterion falls within chance levels. 
Being aware of the underlying rationale of FCT will likely result in a high number of 
correct/incorrect alternations. In naïve guilty examinees we expect all strategy levels 
to occur naturally with prevalences similar to Orthey et al. (2017), and that different 
criteria can detect different strategies. So the total score criterion will detect the 
examinees who employ level 1 strategies, while the number of runs criterion will 
detect examinees who employ level 2 strategies.  
Specifically, in the current study we investigated two questions: 
i) What is the effect of coaching on the strategies guilty and innocent 
participants select? 
ii) Can correct/incorrect alternations that are correlated with horizontal 
positioning discriminate guilty from innocent participants in cases of 
coaching? 
Our hypotheses are as follows: we expect coached guilty participants to be 
more likely to use higher-level strategies than naïve guilty participants (Hypothesis 
1), because coaching enhances their understanding of the test mechanisms and 
therefore aids strategy selection. Additionally, in line with previous research, we 
expect the correct total criterion to distinguish naïve guilty from innocent 
participants, but not coached guilty from innocent participants (Hypothesis 2). In 
contrast we expect alternations between correct/incorrect alternatives to distinguish 
coached guilty from innocent participants, and thus be resistant to coaching 
(Hypothesis 3). 
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4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
A total of 104 students (78 female) were recruited from the first year 
population. Students were on average 20.32 (SD = 5.70) years old and received 
course credit as compensation. Data of one participant were excluded because he did 
not follow the instructions. Approval from the ethics committee was obtained. 
 
4.3.2 Procedure 
First, examinees were assigned to one of two Virtual Reality (VR) 
simulations in a counterbalanced fashion. Their purpose was to induce crime relevant 
information. Half of the examinees (N = 52) experienced an intelligence scenario, 
wherein the examinee represented an intelligence officer who had to search a 
terrorist’s apartment for clues about an imminent attack. The other half of the 
examinees (N = 52) experienced a real estate scenario, wherein the examinee took 
the role of a real estate agent who explored an apartment (different from the 
terrorist’s apartment). Both simulations featured an interactive 3D environment that 
was explored from the first person perspective. Additionally, only the intelligence 
scenario featured interactable objects that were marked by a salient exclamation 
mark. Upon interaction, a window appeared that displayed a detailed picture of that 
object and a short descriptive text, clarifying the pictures’ content. These objects 
served as the crime relevant information during the following FCT procedure. In 
case of the intelligence scenario the simulation terminated once all objects had been 
interacted with, or after three minutes in the real estate scenario. 
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 After completing the scenario, examinees were informed that they were a 
suspect in a police investigation about a local terrorist and had to pass a lie detection 
procedure. The examinees who had experienced the intelligence scenario 
(henceforward referred to as guilty examinees), were instructed to lie and to 
convince the police that they had never been in the terrorist’s apartment. Examinees 
who had experienced the real estate scenario (henceforward referred to as innocent 
examinees), were informed that they never had been to the terrorist’s apartment and 
that they were falsely accused. They were told that it was their task to convince the 
investigators that they had no knowledge of the terrorist apartment. Then examinees 
were randomly divided into a coached (N = 52) and naïve condition (N = 52), evenly 
split over the two VR scenarios. Coached examinees were provided with an advice 
from their attorney warning them about the mechanisms of the lie detection test 
(naïve examinees received no such information and directly moved on to the next 
part). Coached examinees received the following information:  
“I know the lie detection test you will be forced to take. They will present you with 
questions about a crime that only the perpetrator knows the correct answer to. You 
will be asked to pick an answer alternative and they will instruct you to guess. They 
expect liars to deliberately pick the incorrect answers, to appear innocent. However, 
this is exactly how they identify liars. Innocent suspects are expected to actually 
score within levels of chance on the test.” 
 Subsequently all examinees were subjected to exactly the same binary FCT. 
First, they were informed that they would receive a number of questions and two 
answer alternatives per question. (One answer alternative was always correct and 
encountered by guilty examinees in the intelligence scenario; the other was always 
incorrect and unfamiliar to both guilty and innocent examinees). examinees were 
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forced to select one of the two answer alternatives for each question by clicking on 
them with the mouse and examinees were unaware of the total number of questions 
that would be asked. Answer alternatives were presented pictorially and their 
horizontal alignment (correct answer presented on the left/right side of the screen) 
was determined in the following way: On the first trial of the forced choice test the 
horizontal position of the correct answer was determined randomly. On the 
consecutive trials the correct answer would always be placed on the opposite side of 
the previous trial. This pattern was maintained for the entire test.  
 After completing the FCT all examinees were informed that the lie detection 
test was over and that they should answer the post-test questions honestly. First, they 
received two open questions, ‘What did you do to appear innocent during the lie 
detection test?’ and ‘What strategy did you have in mind to make the investigator 
believe that you were uninvolved with the terrorist?’. Then guilty examinees 
received the questions and answer alternatives again and had to indicate the correct 
answer for each question, which referred to the actual stimulus encountered in the 
intelligence scenario. This served as a memory check. Guilty examinees remembered 
on average 95% of the correct answers (SD = 5.6; worst performance = 80%). 
 
4.3.3 The Forced Choice Test 
The FCT featured 20 different questions about the apartment encountered in 
the intelligence scenario. All answer alternatives were presented pictorially. The 
incorrect answer in each pair was taken from a third simulation and was therefore 
unbeknownst to every participant. A critical assumption of these pairs was that each 
option was equally plausible (Doob & Kirschenbaum, 1973) to prevent deviation 
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from chance due to obvious/obscure answers. We used the innocent’s answers to 
check for biased items. Adhering to the rejection criteria used in Jelicic et al. (2004) 
and Merckelbach et al. (2002) all of our items were considered unbiased, because no 
answer alternative was chosen by more than 70% or less than 30% of the sample. 
Therefore, all questions were used for the analysis. 
 
4.3.4. Design and measures 
This study featured a 2 (Veracity: guilty vs innocent) x 2 (Coaching: coached 
vs naïve) between-subjects design with ‘correct total’ (number of correct options 
chosen) and ‘number of runs’ (number of alternations between correct/incorrect 
options plus 1) as dependent measures. Both criteria were subjected to a z-
transformation according to Siegel’s (1956) formula for binomial distributions. For 
the correct total criterion, z scores of 0 indicate chance performance, negative z 
scores indicate avoidance of correct information and positive z scores endorsement 
of correct information. For the number of runs the same applies in terms of number 
of alternations between correct and incorrect answer alternatives. 
Detection accuracy was measured in terms of sensitivity and specificity. 
Sensitivity indicates the proportion of guilty participants correctly classified and 
specificity indicates the proportion of innocent participants correctly classified. 
Sensitivity and specificity are based on a specific cut off point. For the correct total 
the cut off was based on the theoretical binary distribution as we expect innocent 
participants to inadvertently follow it. Sensitivity and specificity were computed for 
the conventionally used unidirectional 5% specificity cut off, as well as for 10% and 
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20% cut offs (e.g. Binder, Larrabee, & Millis, 2014; Van Impelen, Jelicic, Otgaar, & 
Merckelbach, 2017).  
Cut offs for the runs criterion were computed with sample parameters of 
innocent participants for both conditions. There were two reasons for this choice. 
First, guilty and innocent examinees were expected to deviate from the binary 
distribution due to our manipulation, which means a cut off based on the binary 
distribution would not appropriately reflect the differences between guilty and 
innocent examinees. Second, simulating innocent population parameters was 
impossible due to lack of population estimates. Consequently, we acknowledge that 
cut off specific detection accuracy for the runs criterion may be inflated as cut offs 
were derived from sample parameters as opposed to population parameters. We 
assessed sensitivity and specificity at the unidirectional 5%, 10%, and 20% cut offs. 
We choose for multiple cut offs for this criterion, because it measures a different 
psychological process (i.e. randomization) and therefore no optimal cut off is known 
yet. .  
Additionally, we computed the incremental validity of the runs criterion in a 
two-step classification procedure as in Meijer et al. (2007). First the sample was 
subjected to the correct total criterion to detect cases of underperformance using the 
traditional 5% cut off. Any examinees that passed the correct total criterion were 
then subjected to the runs criterion, with higher alternation rates than predicted by 
chance being indicative of deception. Accuracy was expressed as the combined 
sensitivity and combined specificity.  
Assessing the accuracy of such a two-step procedure is relevant, because 
level 2 strategies occur naturally in naïve guilty. In fact, in Orthey et al. (2017) it was 
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the most prevalent strategy, meaning that the runs-criterion could be relevant even 
for cases without coaching. Furthermore, as seen in Orthey et al. (2017) some 
examinees who employed level 2 strategies still were detected using the total score 
criterion, likely because they incorrectly judged how many correct items were 
required for the test score to still fall within chance performance. Therefore, we must 
estimate how many cases of level 2 strategies still get detected by the total score 
criterion, as these cases would have been detected anyway. The remaining detection 
accuracy then indicates the incremental validity of detecting intentional 
randomization. As sensitivity and specificity correspond to a specific cut off point 
they do not generalize to other cut offs. Instead, the Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
can be used as an indicator for detection accuracy independent of cut off points. It is 
based on the Receiver Operator Characteristic (Tanner & Swets, 1954; ROC), which 
plots sensitivity against specificity for the entire range of the continuous criterion. 
The AUC is the area covered by the ROC. It ranges between 0 to 1 with 0.5 
indicating chance performance, and a higher number meaning better discrimination 
between guilty and innocent examinees. 
Participants answers to the open questions about their behaviour during the 
test were categorised into three strategy levels. Level 0 strategies represented 
compliance with the test instructions to select the correct answers alternatives. 
Participants who indicated that they selected answers they thought were correct or 
those who indicated to use no strategy were assigned to this level. Level 1 strategies 
represented a reaction to the test instructions. Participants who said they avoided 
correct answers on purpose or controlled their demeanour while selecting answers 
were assigned to this level. Level 2 represented patterns that purposefully included 
correct and incorrect answers. Participants who said they imitated responses patterns 
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they believe people ignorant of the crime information would produce, or said they 
selected answers that seem obvious (either correct or incorrect), or indicated 
purposefully randomising between correct and incorrect answers were assigned to 
this level. Two blind and independent raters categorised the responses according to 
examples within each strategy level as specified in Orthey et al. (2017). Inter rater 
reliability was high (89% absolute agreement). Responses that did not fit any 
category were omitted from the analysis (1 participant). 
It is important to note that the strategy level measure indicates the intended 
behavior of the participant only. For guilty participants the strategy level is 
predictive of the total score (level 0 => overperformance, level 1 => 
underperformance, level 2 => chanceperformance). For innocent participants this is 
not the case, as by definition they were unaware of the correct answer alternatives 
and the alternatives were equally plausible. As their beliefs over which particular 
item was correct was unrelated to the true veracity of the test items, their strategy 
level should be unrelated to the total score criterion. Consequently, we can assume 
that manipulating examinees beliefs will only have behavioural consequences for 
guilty examinees. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1 Strategies 
First we examined the strategies examinees reported. We hypothesized that 
coaching would elicit higher level strategies in guilty examinees (Hypothesis 1). 
Table 1 depicts the frequencies of selected strategies divided by conditions. Innocent 
examinees reported using all types of strategies naturally, but when coached they 
seemed to endorse either answering honestly or randomising. Naïve guilty 
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examinees also reported using all three strategy levels. Level 2 strategies were the 
most frequent, followed closely by level 1 strategies. Level 0 strategies occurred 
rarely. When coached guilty examinees exclusively used level 2 strategies. 
 
Table 4.1 Frequencies of strategy levels per condition 
   Truth tellers Liars 
   Naïve Coached Naïve Coached 
Level 0  8 15 2 - 
Level 1 12 1 10 - 
Level 2 5 10 13 26 
Other 1 - - - 
N 26 26 25 26 
 
 
 A chi-square test was performed and we found a relationship between 
coaching and the used strategy level for guilty examinees, Χ2 (2, N = 51) = 16.32, p < 
.001. Coached guilty examinees were more likely to exhibit a level 2 strategy than 
naïve guilty examinees. A closer look at the data revealed that the entire sample of 
coached guilty examinees used a level 2 strategy, whereas the naïve guilty examinee 
sample consisted out a number of level 0, 1, and 2 strategies (M = 1.44, SD = 0.65). 
This supports Hypothesis 1. 
 Additionally, we analyzed the detection accuracy of the correct total criterion 
per strategy level. Ninety percent of naïve guilty examinees, who used level 1 
strategies were correctly identified, whereas 23.1% of naïve guilty examinees, who 
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used level 2 strategies were correctly classified. All coached guilty examinees 
reported using level 2 strategies and only 8% of them were correctly classified. 
Together this supports the idea that the correct total criterion is apt at detecting level 
1, but not level 2 strategies and that coaching facilitates the use of level 2 strategies. 
 
4.4.2 Detection Accuracy 
We assessed detection accuracy for specific cut-offs as well as the entire 
range of possible criteria (see Table 2). First we examined the correct total criterion. 
In the naïve condition a low correct total differentiated guilty from innocent 
examinees better than chance
5
, AUC = .69, p = .020, CI = [.53 .86]. In the coaching 
condition the correct total did not distinguish guilty from innocent examinees better 
than chance, AUC = .53, p = .742, CI = [.37 .69]. Similarly, when using the 
conventionally used unidirectional decision cut off of 5%, we found a 48% 
sensitivity and a 92% specificity in naïve guilty examinees. Using a 10% cut off 
sensitivity rose to 56% while specificity remained the same at 92.3%. At the 20% cut 
off sensitivity was 64% with a specificity of 88.5%. When coached, the sensitivity 
dropped to 7.7% with a 100% specificity at the 5% cut off. At the 10% cut off 
sensitivity remained at 7.7%, but specificity declined to 92.3%. At the 20% cut off 
sensitivity was 11.5% with a specificity of 88.5%. This suggested a sharp decline in 
detection accuracy for the correct total criterion in case of coaching, which supports 
Hypothesis 2. 
                                                          
5
 Caution is warranted when interpreting these AUCs. The empirical ROCs are skewed (see Fig 1.), 
which is a consequence of the abnormal distribution of the criterion (due to different strategies 
used). The ROC implies that the correct total criterion is apt at detecting underperformance (level 1 
strategy), but not other strategy levels. Similarly, the runs criterion performed worse than chance, 
because it detects over- not underperformance. 
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Next we examined the runs criterion. In the naïve condition, a high number of 
alternations resulted in worse general detection accuracy than chance
1
, AUC = .26, p 
= .008, CI = [.14 .43]. However, in the coaching condition the number of runs 
differentiated guilty from innocent examinees significantly better than chance 
performance, AUC = .69, p = .018, CI = [.55 .84]. We examined the detection 
accuracy for multiple suggested single cut offs and used the unidirectional cut offs of 
5%, 10%, and 20%. In the naïve condition, the runs criterion featured a 0% 
sensitivity at the 5% cut off, which rose to 8% for the 10% and 20% cut off. 
Specificity was highest for the 5% and 10% cut offs with 92.31%. At the 20% cut off 
it declined to 80.71%. In the coaching condition, the 5% cut off featured a 7.69% 
sensitivity and 100% specificity. At the 10% cut off sensitivity increased to 34.62%, 
but specificity declined to 96.15%. At the 20% cut off sensitivity was 57.69% and 
specificity was at 69.23%. Thus, for both conditions the best sensitivity/specificity 
ratio was found at the 10% cut off. In any case the AUCs indicate that number of 
runs criterion was able to detect coached guilty examinees, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 4.2 Detection accuracy for the alternations criterion 
 Sensitivity Specificity AUC p 95% CI 
 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20%    
Total test score criterion 
Naïve 48% 56% 64% 92.3% 92.3% 88.5% .69 .020 [.53 .86] 
Coached 7.7% 7.7% 11.5% 100% 92.3% 88.5% .53 .742 [.37 .69] 
Number of runs criterion 
Naïve 0% 8% 8% 92.31% 92.31% 80.71% .26 .008 [.14 .43] 
Coached 7.69% 34.62% 57.69% 100% 96.15% 69.23% .69 .018 [.55 .84] 
Notes. Sensitivity & specificity for number of runs criterion were based on the undirectional 5%, 10%, and 20% cut off points corresponding to the innocent samples.  
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Figure 4.1 Receiver operating characteristic curve for correct total and alternation 
criteria for naïve and coaching conditions. Receiver operating characteristic cruves 
in the naïve condition were aberrant. This is likely a consequence of the abnormal 
distribution of strategy levels used in this condition. In the coaching condition, all 
participants reported using the same strategy level. 
 
Additionally, we expressed the difference between guilty and innocent 
examinees for the correct total and runs criterion in terms of their effect size Cohen’s 
d. However, this indicator was only computed for the coaching condition, as only in 
this condition the entire guilty sample utilized the same strategy level and was 
therefore assumed to be normally distributed. We found no effect for the correct total 
criterion (Cohen’s d = -0.02), as the coached guilty examinees (M = -0.38, SD = 
1.26) matched the responses of coached innocent examinees (M = -0.36, SD = 0.99). 
The runs criterion had a medium effect (Cohen’s d = -0.41), as coached guilty 
examinees (M = -0.05, SD = 1.18) favored alternating between correct and incorrect 
answer alternatives, but coached innocent examinees prioritized alternations between 
horizontal positions (M = -0.46, SD = 0.91).  
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4.4.3 Incremental Validity 
 Finally we assessed the incremental validity of a two-step classification 
process. As step 1 we used the correct total criterion with the conventional 
unidirectional cut off at 5%.That is, all participants whose correct total score fell 
within underperformance were classified as guilty. As the second step the remaining 
sample was subjected to the runs criterion using the three unidirectional cut offs 5%, 
10%, and 20%. Accuracy was expressed as the combined detection accuracy of steps 
1 and 2. See table 3 for corresponding sensitivities and specificities. The best ratio of 
sensitivity/specificity was found at the 10% cut off. In the naïve condition, we found 
a sensitivity of 56% and a specificity of 84.62%. In the coaching condition, 
sensitivity was at 42.31% with a specificity of 96.15%. Combined detection 
accuracies indicated that sensitivity and specificity of steps 1 and 2 were additive, 
suggesting a unique contribution from each criterion. 
 
Table 4.3 Detection accuracy of two step classification using total score criterion 
and the number of runs criterion. 
 Sensitivity Specificity 
 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20% 
Naïve 48.00 56.00 56.00 84.62 84.62 73.08 
Coached 15.38 42.31 65.38 100 96.15 69.23 
Notes. Total score criterion (step 1) utilized unidirectional cut off of the binary distributions. The 
number of runs criterion (step 2) was based on the undirectional 5%, 10%, and 20% cut off points 
corresponding to the innocent samples.  
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4.5 Discussion 
We coached half of our guilty and innocent examinees and then submitted them to a 
FCT. In an attempt to detect coached examinees we assessed the number of runs 
(alternations between correct and incorrect answers) in a modified FCT. We 
manipulated the horizontal presentation of correct answer alternatives to alternate 
between trials to create a dependency between horizontal (pattern that looks random) 
and correct switches (pattern that falls within chance performance). If one increases, 
the other has to decrease. We measured detection accuracy for the number of correct 
answer alternatives chosen and the number of runs as well as the strategies 
examinees reported they used to defeat the test. 
 Regarding the strategies examinees reported, frequencies of strategy levels in 
our naïve condition closely matched those reported in Orthey et al. (2017). Coaching 
increased the reported strategy level for guilty examinees and coached guilty 
examinees exclusively reported using level 2 strategies. This is also reflected in the 
detection accuracy of the correct total criterion per strategy level. In naïve guilty 
examinees, the test detected level 1 strategies well, but not level 2 strategies. 
Similarly, detection accuracy for level 2 strategies in our coaching condition was 
very low. 
 The findings from this study support the idea that strategy selection is based 
on the beliefs one holds over the test mechanism and that strategies translate into 
actual test behavior (see Zvi, Nachson, & Elaad, 2012 and Zvi, Nachson, & Elaad, 
2015 for similar findings a physiological concealed memory detection test). 
However, it is noteworthy that detection accuracies for level 2 strategies were not the 
same for both conditions. In our naïve condition - and in Orthey et al. (2017) - 
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between 23 – 50% of guilty who used a level 2 strategy were still detected as 
opposed to 8% in cases of coaching. A likely explanation is already provided by 
Orthey et al. (2017). They reasoned that as strategy onset is currently unknown, 
naïve guilty examinees could have started to use a level 2 strategy too late into the 
test, making them therefore still detectable. In our coaching condition, this problem 
has probably not occurred, as participants were coached before they even started the 
test, which means that they could have started with their level 2 strategy at the very 
first question. 
 Detection accuracy in our naïve condition matched that of other experiments, 
as did the decline in detection accuracy in our coaching condition for the correct total 
criterion. As expected in our naïve condition we found a moderate sensitivity (48%) 
and good specificity (92%), which matched the range of previous experiments using 
naïve examinees (Giger et al., 2010; Jelicic et al., 2004; Meijer et al., 2007; 
Merckelbach et al., 2002; Orthey et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2012). In the presence of 
coaching sensitivity declined (8%), but specificity remained high (100%), matching 
the findings in Verschuere et al. (2008), reinforcing their conclusion that forced 
choice testing is not resistant to coaching when using correct total criterion.  
 The AUC of the runs criterion in the naïve condition suggests below chance 
accuracy levels. With a 10% cut off, this criterion featured a 8% sensitivity and a 
92.31% specificity. This poor detection accuracy is likely a consequence of the 
underlying abnormal strategy level distribution. This criterion is geared towards 
detecting level 2 strategies, which made up only 40% of the naïve sample. Hence 
sensitivity is expected to be low. Furthermore, the poor AUC is explained by the 
substantial presence of level 1 strategies, because underperformance is negatively 
related to the number of runs. Selecting only incorrect answers, also means not 
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switching between correct and incorrect answers, which is what the runs criterion 
was intended to detect. Hence its’ detection accuracy is poor when alone applied to 
all strategy levels at once. 
 However, in contrast to Verschuere et al. (2008) and Jelicic et al. (2004), our 
runs criterion did differentiate between coached guilty and innocent examinees. We 
found a medium effect as guilty examinees provided responses with stronger 
tendencies to randomise between correct and incorrect answer alternatives, while 
innocent examinees were more inclined to randomise horizontally. This difference 
was best expressed at the 10% cut off point instead of the commonly used 5%.  
We acknowledge that single cut off accuracies may be inflated as the cut offs 
were computed with a sample instead of population parameters and therefore may be 
over fitted. However, the value of the runs criterion was clearly present in the AUC 
in a group exclusively reporting level 2 strategies. Thus, alternations between correct 
and incorrect answer alternatives can discriminate coached guilty from innocent 
examinees, even with small test-sizes as long as a response pattern can either look 
‘random’ or fall within chance performance, but not both. 
 The combined detection accuracy of the two-step classification process with 
the correct total criterion and alternations criterion suggests that the effects of each 
criterion are additive. Thus, each criterion captured a unique subgroup of our guilty 
samples. The correct total criterion was sensitive to participants using level 1 
strategies (e.g. avoiding correct information) and the runs criterion to those using 
level 2 strategies (mixture of correct and incorrect answers). Consequently, the runs 
criterion provides incremental validity to the FCT paradigm by detecting intentional 
randomisation either occurring naturally or as a consequence of coaching. 
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The argument can be made that we coached examinees specifically regarding 
the correct total criterion, and that similarly coaching can be extended to incorporate 
the runs criterion as well. Nevertheless, our findings are still relevant for two 
reasons. First, as level 2 strategies also occur in naïve examinees, the runs criterion 
can increase the detection accuracy in naïve examinees. Secondly, trying to apply 
countermeasures for multiple criteria at once is difficult and likely taxing on 
cognitive resources, thus reducing the likelihood to succeed.  
As for methodology, we wish to address the common critique in deception 
research of virtual reality applications and mock crimes. Both are often considered a 
threat to ecological validity in deception detection. We argue that this is not the case 
here. The test itself was presented and conducted just as in reality. The virtual reality 
mock crime simulation only served to induce crime-related information in guilty 
examinees. This is necessary to ensure that the assumption is met that guilty 
examinees recognize the correct answer alternatives. The psychological construct 
researched in forced choice testing is how examinees decide to choose on each trial, 
not how they came to know the correct answer alternatives in each trial.  
Another potential concern is the validity of verbal self-reports as our measure 
for strategies. There has been considerable debate about the question how accurate 
self-reported measures are (Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977; Ericsson, & Simon, 1980; 
Schwarz, 1999). The concern is that human subjects may not be aware of the true 
reasons of their behavior and when asked about it can only produce a post hoc 
rationalization. To address this issue we specifically kept our questions focused on 
actual test behavior (i.e., ‘What did you do to defeat the test?’ instead of ‘What was 
your strategy to defeat the test?’). Therefore, the impact of measurement unreliability 
is kept to a minimum. 
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In sum, we found further support for the idea that guilty examinee’s test 
behavior is governed by a strategy selection process based on their beliefs over the 
test’s mechanism. We conclude that the correct total criterion is vulnerable to 
coaching, but coached guilty examinees can be detected using our modified runs test.  
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5.1 Abstract 
The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used to detect malingered cognitive deficits. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that a large proportion of malingerers uses 
effective counter strategies to avoid detection, such as intentional random 
responding. To detect randomization, we investigated the runs test, which focusses 
on elevated alternation rates between correct and incorrect answers, and developed a 
new criterion.  Our new criterion was defined as biased responding towards 
perceived (but not actual) trial difficulty. We asked 73 participants to malinger 
red/green blindness and subjected them to either a standard FCT procedure or a FCT 
with trials of varying opacity, creating the appearance of varying difficulty. 
Malingerers’ responses were compared to genuine chance performance. The runs test 
detected malingerers better than chance in the standard FCT. With varying opacity 
only the response bias criterion detected malingerers better than chance. Both criteria 
are viable methods to detect intentional randomization in the FCT. 
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5.2 Introduction 
The Forced Choice Test (FCT) can be used to detect feigned memory loss for 
events (e.g. Pankratz, 1983; Denney, 1996; Bianchini, Mathias, & Greve, 2001). In a 
FCT, an examinee is presented with a number of questions about the event, and each 
question is presented with two answer alternatives of which only one is correct. The 
examinee is instructed to select the correct answer to each question or to guess in 
case they do not know. The idea behind this test is that if an examinee truly has no 
recollection of the event, the total test score will fall within chance levels. 
Malingerers tend to purposefully select incorrect answer alternatives, and are more 
likely to obtain test scores lower than predicted by chance (so called 
underperformance). Similarly, FCTs can be used to detect sensory dysfunction, e.g., 
deafness (Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975). Here, the examinee is presented with a 
series of trials, on half of which a sound is presented. When asked whether a sound 
was played, malingerers are more likely to underreport the number of correct 
answers. Laboratory studies investigating the detection accuracy for 
underperformance in FCTs show that sensitivity – i.e. the correct detection of 
malingerers - varies between 40% and 60% (see Giger, Merten, Merckelbach, & 
Oswald, 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, 2004; Meijer, Smulders, 
Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; Orthey, Vrij, 
Leal, & Blank, 2017; Orthey, Vrij, Meijer, Leal, & Blank, 2018; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, 
Leal, & Hillman, 2012) while specificity – the accurate classification of genuine 
performers - is around 95% (see Giger et al., 2010; Meijer et al., 2007; Orthey et al., 
2017; Orthey et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2012).  
The sensitivity estimates outlined above corresponds to the prevalence of the 
specific strategies malingerers employ to avoid detection. Specifically, three 
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hierarchical strategy levels predict different types of test scores (see Orthey et al., 
2017; Orthey et al., 2018). Each level is based on the belief the examinee holds over 
the test’s detection mechanism. Based on this belief each strategy level is associated 
with a distinct response strategy. Specifically, Level 0 is associated with compliance 
with the test instructions, which results in endorsement of correct answers, leading to 
overperformance. This strategy occurs rarely (< 5%; Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey et 
al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2012). Level 1 strategies are based on the belief the test is 
designed to detect level 0 strategies, resulting in a counter-response such as selecting 
the incorrect answers instead, which leads to underperformance. Approximately 40% 
of the participants report having used Level 1 strategies (Orthey et al., 2017; Orthey 
et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2012). Level 2 strategies are based on the belief that the test 
is designed to detect level 1 strategies and predicts a counter-response, such as 
providing a mixture of correct and incorrect answers, so that test scores fall within 
chance performance. Level 2 strategies are most prevalent (around 45 – 50%; Orthey 
et al., 2017; Orthey et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2012). The traditional FCT criterion 
focuses on underperformance (e.g. Bianchini et al., 2001; Van Oorsouw, & 
Merckelbach, 2010). Hence, it is well suited for detecting level 1 strategies, but not 
suitable for detecting levels 0 and 2 strategies. That means in order to increase the 
sensitivity of FCTs it is important to improve the detection rates for level 2 strategy 
users, as they make up the majority of malingerers. 
Examinees employing a level 2 strategy attempt to simulate patterns of 
randomness. To detect this, the ‘runs test’ has been suggested. The criterion in this 
test is the number of alternations between correct and incorrect answers. It is based 
on the consistent finding that humans produce more alternations (≈60% alternation 
rate) than expected by chance (≈50% alternation rate) when trying to generate a 
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random sequence of two options (see Wagenaar, 1972; Falk, & Konold, 1997; 
Nickerson, 2002). In previous studies, the runs test yielded limited success, 
identifying only a fraction of malingerers (Jelicic et al., 2004; Verschuere, Meijer, & 
Crombez, 2008). A likely reason for the poor diagnostic validity found in these 
studies is a lack of power (Orthey et al., 2018). The alternation likelihood of real 
chance performance (50%) and alternations generated by humans (≈ 60%) are too 
similar to elicit statistically significant differences in short tests. This systematic 
difference becomes visible only in tests containing a sufficient number of items. In 
the current study, we implement the runs test on a considerably longer FCT than in 
previous studies, hypothesizing that the runs test becomes diagnostic with larger test 
sizes. 
Aside from the runs criterion, we also explore the possibility of introducing 
an additional criterion specifically designed to detect level 2 strategies. This idea 
draws on the principle of performance curves, which describe the natural decline of 
performance over test items with increasing difficulty (e.g. Gudjonsson, & 
Shackelton, 1986; Frederick, & Crosby, 2000; Frederick, Crosby, & Wynkoop, 
2000; Frederick, & Foster, 1991). Frederick and Foster (1991) examined malingered 
cognitive deficits with a FCT of 100 trials in which the examinee had to identify 
relationships among abstract figures. The difficulty ranged from items so easy that 
even patients with genuine cognitive impairment could get the correct answer, to 
items so difficult that unimpaired examinees’ likelihood to select the correct answer 
equalled chance performance. Even though the length and slope of this performance 
decline may differ between individuals, they all share the same pattern, namely that 
performance gradually declines with increasing difficulty. Interestingly, this was not 
the case for malingerers, who performed worse than chance on easy items and 
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trended towards chance performance on items with increasing difficulty. 
Performance curves can also be introduced in a FCT by breaking it up into separate 
segments. Hiscock and Hiscock (1989) report the case of a patient whom they 
suspected of malingering. He was asked to memorize a five-digit number and to 
identify it among two alternatives after a short retention interval. The task was 
divided in three blocks of 24 trials with retention intervals of five seconds in the first 
block, ten seconds in the second block and 15 seconds in the last block. The task was 
designed to be so easy that the retention interval has no effect, evidenced by the 
performance of a five-year old, who showed above chance level performance for all 
three intervals. The patient displayed chance performance in the first block and 
below chance performance in the second and third block. Consequently, the authors 
suggest that malingerers adjust their test performance relative to the perceived 
difficulty of the test.   
So far, the effect of performance curves has only been investigated for the 
underperformance criterion. Instead, we test a new criterion that produces a 
performance curve as a function of the perceived – but not the actual – difficulty, 
sensitive to randomizing between correct and incorrect answers. Take, for example, a 
standard FCT to detect malingered red/green blindness. On each trial, an examinee is 
presented with a red and green square, and asked to select the green one. Malingerers 
using level 2 strategies, would select red and green squares approximately equally 
often, resulting in a total score within chance performance. If we vary the opacity of 
the red and green objects over trials, the examinee must not only take into 
consideration how many correct and incorrect answers were selected, but also at 
what opacity. Hence, malingerers could differ from chance performance by 
displaying a preference to avoid/endorse correct answers relative to the perceived 
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difficulty of the trials. Perceived difficulty was used, because it can be introduced as 
an orthogonal factor to the malingered cognitive deficits. So, the task may look 
more/less difficult, but would have no effect on genuinely impaired performance. 
Malingerers are expected to be unable to have an accurate estimate of how an 
actually impaired examinee would respond, an effect other malingering tools such as 
the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (see Merckelbach, & 
Smith, 2003; Jelicic, Hessels, & Merckelbach, 2006; Jelicic, Ceunen, Peters, & 
Merckelbach, 2011) make use of as well. Consequently, an examinee may, for 
example, think that on trials with strong opacity, the difference between the two 
objects is so clear that even red/green blind participants will perceive the difference, 
and select the correct alternative. This would result in a correlation between 
correct/incorrect answers and opacity, and this correlational response bias can serve 
as a new criterion specifically designed to detect intentional randomization.  
In the current experiment, we asked examinees to malinger red green 
blindness and subjected them to one of two conditions: a standard FCT or a FCT 
where perceived difficulty varied per trial. Perceived difficulty was induced by 
varying the opacity of the stimuli over trials. We chose malingered red/green 
blindness for two reasons. First, perceived difficulty could be manipulated easily and 
objectively through opacity. Second, red/green blindness is by definition associated 
with chance performance, not just a steep decline in ability. Therefore, response for 
genuine red/green blindness could be generated through computer simulation. We 
evaluated three measures to detect examinees employing level 2 strategies, i.e., who 
employ intentional randomization of correct and incorrect answers. We only analyse 
examinees using level 2 strategies, and therefore expect that the number of correct 
alternatives selected will fail to distinguish malingered from genuine red/green 
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blindness (Hypothesis 1). Our FCT consists of 100 trials, which is the same test 
length often used to assess the human ability to generate randomness (see Wagenaar, 
1972; Falk & Konold, 1997; Nickerson, 2002), and considerably larger than what 
has been employed in previous studies (see Jelicic et al., 2004; Verschuere et al., 
2008). For that reason, we expect the runs test - based on the number of alternations 
between correct and incorrect - to detect malingerers using a level 2 strategy better 
than chance, with higher alternation rates indicating malingered performance 
(Hypothesis 2).  Additionally, we expect biased responding as a function of the 
varying degree of opacity. We refer to this bias simply as response bias, and expect 
this to detect malingerers better than chance (Hypothesis 3). 
 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
 We tested 84 examinees from a university undergraduate population. 
Genuine red/green blindness was an exclusion criterion and zero examinees were 
excluded for this reason. Five examinees were excluded, because they disregarded 
the instructions, leaving 79 remaining. As this experiment examines examinees who 
naturally choose a level 2 strategy of intentionally randomizing correct and incorrect 
answers, we excluded all participants who reported using a different strategy. As a 
consequence we excluded six, leaving 37 in the Standard condition and 36 in the 
Opacity condition. Of these 73 examinees, 53 were female, 20 were male. Their 
mean age was 23.00 (SD = 6.61). Examinees were rewarded for their participation 
with 5 euros or course credit. Ethical approval was obtained.  
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5.3.2 Procedure 
 All examinees were instructed to feign red/green blindness. To do so we 
provided them with some information about red/green blindness. In essence, 
examinees received information that both red and green look like grey to someone 
with genuine red/green blindness. The information was made to look like it was 
derived from Wikipedia (“Color blindness”, n.d.). In addition, examinees were told 
that a number of tests would follow to establish whether their alleged red/green 
blindness was genuine. The warning was issued in order to facilitate the adoption of 
level 2 strategies and its’ effectiveness was reflected in the small number of excluded 
examinees. 
 The test started with two filler tasks such that the FCT was embedded into a 
credible task battery. First, we asked examinees to give a brief written statement 
indicating how red/green blindness has negatively affected them in their life. After 
that we administered three Ishihara plots that consist of a number of differently 
coloured circles. The hues are chosen in a way that colour blind and examinees 
without visual impairment see different numbers. Each plot was provided with two 
answer alternatives. One was the number people with red/green blindness would 
have seen and the other was the number unimpaired people would have seen 
(Ishihara, 2011). No data were recorded on both tasks. 
 Then, examinees were subjected to the FCT examination on a computer and 
randomly assigned to either the Standard or Opacity condition. In the Standard 
condition, examinees were informed that in the next part they would be presented 
with red and green squares and were instructed to always indicate the green square. 
Each trial had the same structure. First, in the middle of the screen the instruction to 
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select the green square was presented and at the bottom centre was a ‘next’ button 
located. Once examinees clicked the next button the instructions disappeared and 
two equal sized rectangles appeared at the top of the screen. The rectangles were in 
their entirety red (RGB = 255,0,0) or green (RGB = 0,255,0). Examinees could 
indicate their choice by clicking within the particular rectangle with a mouse. The 
horizontal location (left/right) of the green square was determined randomly on each 
trial. In total 100 of these trials were presented to each examinee. 
In the Opacity condition we manipulated the opacity of both rectangles. 
Opacity refers to how see-through the rectangles were and can range from 100% - 
not see-through at all - to 0% - completely vanished -. In essence, with lower opacity 
it becomes harder to perceive the colour of both rectangles. Out of the 100 trials, 10 
featured 100 % opacity and were identical to the trials in the control condition. The 
remaining 90 trials featured opacities from 10 % to 99 % in increments of 1%. We 
chose to omit trials with opacities lower than 10%, to make sure people with normal 
vision can still reasonably be expected to perceive the colour of the stimuli. The 
order of presentation was randomized over all 100 trials.  
After the FCT, examinees were told that the assessment was over and that 
they should answer everything honestly. Then examinees were asked the following 
question: “What did you do during the test procedure to make the investigator 
believe that you are actually red-green color blind?” Their response was recorded, 
transcribed and coded by two independent coders (see below). 
Finally we presented all examinees with 20 trails featuring 100% opacity. 
Their task was to honestly indicate the green rectangle on each trial. This served as a 
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performance check. Examinees who made one or more mistakes on this task were 
excluded. Zero participants were excluded for this reason. 
 
5.3.3 Design 
Three dependent variables were used. We computed the correct scores by 
summing the number of trials where the correct answer alternative was selected. For 
the ‘runs test’ we computed the number of alternations between correct/incorrect 
items. Both scores were transformed into z-scores according to the binomial 
distribution (see Siegel & Castellan, 1988, p. 43). Hence, the z-scores indicated how 
(un)likely the raw score was to occur through chance. In the Opacity condition, we 
estimated the response bias by conducting within each examinee a t-test for a point-
biserial correlation with their choice (correct/incorrect) on each trial and the 
corresponding opacity used in that trial. As a result, we obtained for each examinee a 
correlation, indicating the strength and direction of the bias, and a p-value, indicating 
the significance of the correlation. We used the p-value as criterion for the response 
bias as the smaller the p-value was, the more unlikely the response bias was to occur 
through chance. The reason we chose the p-value over the correlation was that 
unlikely correlations can be positive or negative. The p-value avoids this issue, as it 
is the same disregarding the sign of the correlation. Furthermore, we computed a 
binary criterion, which classified whether the correlation could be considered 
statistically significant using the (one-sided) 5% cut off. 
Examinees who are truly colour blind can be expected to show random 
performance. We therefore compared the distribution of our malingered examinees 
to a simulated random distribution. Thus, this experiment featured a 2 red/green 
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blindness (Malingered vs Genuine) x 2 Opacity (Standard vs Opacity) between-
subjects design.  We simulated the response patterns of the genuine red/green 
blindness group for the standard and opacity condition. Each response pattern was 
simulated to the trial level. By using random numbers we determined on each trial 
whether a participant would select a correct or incorrect response with a 50% 
probability each. Random numbers were generated using atmospheric noise (see 
RANDOM.org). With these random numbers we simulated choices as if an 
examinee was guessing on each trial. We computed the correct score, number of runs 
and the response bias the same way as for the malingerers. In total, 5 000 responses 
were generated for genuine red/green blindness in the Standard and Opacity 
condition each. 
The validity of the three dependent variables will be assessed by their ability 
to discriminate malingered from genuine red/green blindness. General detection 
accuracy was assessed with the Area Under the Curve (AUC) of the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) for the different criteria (see Tanner & Swets, 1954; 
Hanley, & McNeil, 1982). The ROC plots the sensitivity, detection rate for 
malingerers, against the specificity, detection rate for genuine performance, for all 
possible cut offs. The AUC ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.5 indicating chance 
performance. Values significantly higher than 0.5 suggest that the criterion has 
diagnostic value. 
 Examinees’ answers about their behaviour during the FCT were transcribed 
and coded into three strategy levels as suggested by Orthey et al. (2017) and Orthey 
et al. (2018). These strategy levels were referenced to the original test instruction 
(‘Select the correct answer alternatives. If you don’t know, guess.’) and were defined 
as follows: A Level 0 strategy forms no beliefs over the test’s classification 
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mechanism and leads to compliance with the test instructions (i.e. overperformance). 
A Level 1 strategy forms a belief based on the instructions and behaviour manifests 
as a reaction to it. The most common behaviour is intentional avoidance of correct 
information leading to underperformance. A Level 2 strategy is based on the belief 
that the test uses a Level 1 classification mechanism and therefore test behaviour 
manifests as a reaction to a Level 1 strategy. The most common behaviour is to 
attempt to provide a random mixture of correct and incorrect information.  
5.4 Results  
Table 5.1 Detection accuracies for all criteria for the Standard and Opacity 
condition. 
Condition  Criterion AUC p 95 % CI 
Standard     
 Correct total .53 .527 [.42 .63] 
 Runs test .69 < .001 [.57 .81] 
Opacity      
 Correct total .38 .008 [.26 .49] 
 Runs test .55 .299 [.44 .66] 
 Response Bias .69 < .001 [.60 .79] 
Notes: The Correct total and Response Bias criteria assume lower scores to be indicative of 
malingering, while the Runs test assumes larger scores to be indicative of malingering. 
 
 Table 5.1 displays the detection accuracies using the correct scores, the runs 
test and the response bias as detection criteria, respectively. As hypothesized, the 
correct scores did not distinguish malingered from genuine red/green blindness in the 
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Standard condition, AUC = .53, p = .527, 95% CI [.42 .63]. In contrast, malingerers 
in the Opacity condition were detected with below chance level performance, AUC = 
.38, p = .008, 95% CI [.26 .49]. This supports our first hypothesis that the 
underperformance criterion has no predictive validity for examinees randomizing 
between correct and incorrect answers.  
 
Figure 5.1 AUCs of the Runs test in the Standard and Opacity condition as well as 
the Response bias in the Opacity condition for all test lengths from 12 to 100 trials. 
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The runs test detected malingerers in the Standard condition, AUC = .69, p =  
< .001, 95% CI [.57 .81], but not in the Opacity condition, AUC = .55, p = .299, 95% 
CI [.44 .66], better than chance. Hence, there was only partial support for our second 
hypothesis that the runs test can detect examinees randomizing between correct and 
incorrect answers. To further estimate the relationship between test length and 
detection accuracy we computed the AUC for all test lengths by taking the first n 
trials, with n varying from 12 (as recommended in: Van Oorsouw, & Merckelbach, 
2010) to 100 (see Figure 1). The trend suggested that in the Standard condition 
detection accuracy increases with test size and peaked at a test size between 50 to 70 
trials. In the Opacity condition the detection accuracy of the runs test declined with 
test length continuously.  
Finally, we assessed the validity of the response bias in the Opacity 
condition. We used the p-value as a continuous criterion as it indicates how 
(un)likely a response pattern is to occur through chance. The AUC was estimated 
using lower scores as indicative of malingering. We found that this criterion 
differentiated malingered from genuine red/green blindness better than chance, AUC 
= .69, p < .001, 95% CI [.60 .79]. Next we estimated whether malingerers produced 
more response biases that pass the statistical significance threshold than expected by 
chance. A chi-square test indicated that malingerers were more likely to exhibit a 
significant correlation within their response pattern than expected by chance, Χ2 = (1, 
N = 5038) = 44.74, p < .001. We found that 28.95% of malingerers passed the 5% 
threshold. Of the malingerers, who exhibited a statistical significant response bias, 
64% displayed a positive correlation (mean = .43, SD = .17) and 36% displayed a 
negative correlation (mean = -.32, SD = .22). As expected, of the simulated genuine 
red/green blindness 4.94% fell below the 5% threshold. Furthermore, when 
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calculated over all possible test lengths (see Figure 1), the AUC of the response bias 
increased gradually with test length and peaked at 100 trials. These findings support 
our third hypothesis that the response bias can serve as a valid indicator of 
malingering.   
 
5.5 Discussion 
 This study examined the diagnostic value of correct total scores, the runs test 
and the response bias criteria to detect malingered red/green blindness in examinees 
who utilize level 2 strategies, i.e., who randomize between correct and incorrect 
answers, in a Forced Choice Test. In the Standard condition all trials were identical, 
but in our Opacity condition we varied the opacity of both stimuli over all trials in 
order to tempt malingerers into adjusting their alternations between correct and 
incorrect answers according to the opacity of the trials. The purpose of this 
manipulation was to elicit an additional response bias that could serve as a new 
criterion to detect those who employ level 2 strategies.  
 The results in the Standard condition suggest that the runs test has diagnostic 
value provided the test size is large enough. This finding is encouraging for those 
applications of the FCT where the number of trials that are included in the test is 
unbound, such as cases of cognitive deficits. For alleged memory, auditory, or visual 
impairments, trials can be easily generated and repeated. It has less relevance, 
however, in situations where the trials are specific to unique pieces of information, 
for example in cases of autobiographical memory loss (e.g. Jelicic et al., 2004; 
Verschuere et al., 2008). Moreover, the figure plotting the validity for the different 
test lengths indicates a potential test length around 50 to 70 trials, after which the 
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accuracy of the runs test decreases. Future studies could help investigate whether this 
finding replicates, and help pinpoint the optimal test length for this criterion. 
 The effectiveness of the ‘runs test’ was limited to the Standard condition, and 
not present in the Opacity condition. Instead, the response bias proved a valid 
indicator of malingering. As seen in Figure 1, the detection accuracy of the response 
bias gradually increased, while the detection accuracy of the runs test gradually 
decreased. A potential reason for the ineffectiveness of the runs test could be that the 
response bias, in form of the varying opacities, is very salient and malingerers 
preferred to calibrate their response pattern in regards to opacity, rather than with 
regard to their alternation rate between correct and incorrect answers. This finding is 
relevant, because it suggests that response biases can be elicited through perceived 
difficulty. This may make performance curve decision models much more resistant 
to countermeasures, as the malingerer first must determine whether the subsequent 
trials just appear more/less difficult or actually are more/less difficult for genuine 
impairment. Future research may also attempt to combine both types of response 
bias for even better detection accuracy. 
Implementing a response bias to detect malingering features two challenges. 
(i) The introduced bias must be varied and measured objectively. In cases of alleged 
malingered sensory deficits such as visual or audio impairment, degrading/enhancing 
the stimuli can easily be done objectively. In case of malingered memory loss, the 
perceived importance of questions could be manipulated, but this would be 
challenging to do objectively. (ii) The test must contain a sufficient number of trials 
for the statistical assessment of the response bias. This can easily be done for 
malingered sensory deficits as here trials can be repeated as often as necessary. 
However, for malingered memory loss creating a large enough test length is very 
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difficult, because each trial is unique, and events often contain only few pieces of 
information (see Podlesney, 2003). On top of that the malingerer must have 
remembered the piece of information. Thus, in terms of practical application, the 
response bias criterion seems best suited for malingered sensory deficits and less so 
for cases of malingered memory loss. 
Using simulated data to represent genuine performance may raise the concern 
that this limits the ecological validity of our findings. Previous simulation of control 
group behaviour (see Betherlson, Mulchan, Odland, Miller, & Mittenberg, 2013) has 
been shown to be a poor reflection of real clinical samples (see Larrabee, 2014; 
Davis, 2018) in estimating false positive rates as a function of increasing the number 
of tests used to detect malingered performance. Larrabee (2014) argues that the 
performance of real clinical samples resembles a ceiling effect (the majority of the 
sample displays almost perfect performance), rather than a standard normal 
distribution with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 as used for the simulation. 
We recognize these concerns, but argue that they do not apply in this case for two 
reasons. (i) In a FCT, by definition, stimulus pairs featured in the trials are 
indistinguishable for examinees with genuine impairment. Therefore, genuine 
performance follows the chance distribution for all three criteria, which means the 
test behaviour and not only can the test result be simulated. From this follows that 
characteristics of the sample can be expected to be representative of reality. (ii) 
Furthermore, a meta-analysis of the Concealed Information Test, a test that also 
relies on a known distribution, suggests that simulating data is even better, as it 
reduces sampling biases caused by small group sizes (see Meijer, Klein Selle, Elber, 
& Ben-Shakhar, 2014).  
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Another concern may be that the increase in detection accuracy is related to 
statistic fundamentals. With increased sample size the p-values of the t-tests for point 
bi-serial correlation become smaller automatically. While this is true, it is important 
to realize that this only applies to the malinger. Genuine guessing can be expected to 
always produce the same equal distribution of p-values, regardless of test length. In 
contrast, with increasing test length weaker effects within the malingerer population 
yield smaller p-values. As a consequence, detection accuracy of the criterion 
increases, that is at least until all malingerers that do exhibit a response bias are 
detected. Therefore, the effect of test length on the response bias in examinees using 
level 2 strategies is not trivial. 
In sum, our findings suggest that examinees employing level 2 strategies in a 
FCT can be detected by the runs test, provided the FCT features enough trials, or by 
varying perceived difficulty and testing for a systematic response bias. As level 2 
strategies typically remain undetected and are the most common type of strategies, 
these new criteria can be used to increase the overall detection accuracy of FCTs. 
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6.1 General Discussion 
  The objective of this thesis was to develop a model of malingerers’ behaviour 
in the FCT and to use this model to increase the FCT’s detection accuracy. This 
thesis suggests that malingerers can be categorized in one of three subgroups defined 
by strategy levels. Malingerers following a level 0 strategy are expected to comply 
with the test instructions, leading to test scores better than chance performance, 
while malingerers following a level 1 strategy are expected to avoid correct answers, 
leading to test scores worse than chance performance. Finally, malingerers following 
a level 2 strategy are expected to randomize between correct and incorrect answers, 
leading to test scores within chance performance. In four empirical studies 
examinees were asked to simulate loss of memory for a specific event or cognitive 
dysfunction and subjected to a FCT. Examinees’ choices in terms of number of 
correct items selected, alternations between correct and incorrect answers, as well as 
additional response biases were recorded. Their ability to discriminate malingered 
from genuine impairment or loss of memory as well as the relationship between 
detection accuracy and self-reported strategies was examined.  
 In this general discussion, the model of malingerers’ test behaviour will be 
reflected upon in light of its theoretical origin, Cognitive Hierarchy Theory. 
Furthermore, the detection accuracy of the traditional underperformance criterion 
will be discussed as well as ways to improve it. Then experimental limitations will 
be highlighted, followed by a discussion on varying situations a FCT can be applied 
to and the most promising directions to improve detection accuracy, as well as 
alternative practical implications. This chapter will end with a brief comment on 
future directions and challenges for the FCT. 
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6.2 The Three Strategy Levels and Cognitive Hierarchy Theory 
The strategy levels of this model were derived from Cognitive Hierarchy 
Theory (CHT; see Carmerer et al., 2004). CHT can be summarized as follows: 
Players in a game will decide their strategy on their belief of other players’ 
strategies. This involves hypothesizing what other players believe the other players 
will do. With that in mind a strategy is selected that is superior to the other players’ 
strategies. In theory, hypothesizing about other players’ beliefs can result in an 
endless loop as there is no certainty about the other players’ state of mind. Therefore, 
CHT further states that players will choose the best strategy they could devise given 
their available cognitive resources. That means the sophistication of a players’ 
strategy is limited by the available cognitive resources that player has available. 
The model proposed in this thesis defines the strategy levels as the response 
patterns based on how the malingerer believes the FCT intends to detect malingered 
performance. This model is an extension of the traditional assumption that 
malingerers avoid correct information purposefully (e.g. Binder, Larrabee, & Millis, 
2014; Denney, 1996). Not only does it specify which malingerers are detected by the 
underperformance criterion, i.e. level 1 strategies, but also which malingerers are not 
detected by this criterion, i.e. level 0 and level 2 strategies. The added benefit of this 
model is that knowing which malingerers remain undetected can guide research in 
improving the FCT.  
 Despite being based on CHT, this model deviated from CHT in a number of 
ways. First, strategies were not based on a symmetric relationship. In CHT, a game 
has public rules and a player’s strategy is based on their estimate of another player’s 
strategy. That means, a player’s behaviour is based on his/her belief of how other 
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players are going to act in the full knowledge that the other players also know the 
rules of the game and take into consideration what other players are going to do. The 
FCT contains only a single player (the malingerer) and the rules are not public (i.e. 
the malingerer is unaware of the detection mechanism of the FCT). Hence, the 
malingerer’s strategy is a response pattern based on their beliefs about the FCT’s 
detection mechanism. Second, the (observable) number of strategy levels is limited 
in the FCT. In CHT the possible number of response strategies is limited by the 
available cognitive resources, which theoretically can result in more higher level 
strategies. In the FCT levels 0 – 2 predict over-, under-, and chance performance, 
which covers all possible test results. Even if a level 3 strategy exists, it would 
produce a test score that already falls within the category of a previous strategy level, 
making them indistinguishable behaviourally. Third, CHT does not differentiate 
between strategy selection and strategy execution. Results of Chapter 3 indicated that 
imposing cognitive load through time pressure did not affect the strategy selection 
process, as in reducing the frequency of higher order strategies selected, but lowered 
the success rate of the selected higher order strategies instead. As shown in Chapter 
2 manipulating the beliefs of malingerers through misdirection of reasoning did 
affect test responses. Hence, the distinction of strategy selection, what test score 
malingerers intend to achieve, and strategy execution, the actual test result, requires 
further disambiguation. It also provides different angles of manipulating malingerers 
into displaying behaviour distinct from genuine performance.  
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6.3 Detection Accuracy 
For the evaluation of the FCT’s detection accuracy and the validity of the 
proposed model, the data from the control conditions of previous chapters was 
combined to reduce the influence of sampling biases of each study. Data from 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 was combined, because these studies featured the standard FCT 
procedure and therefore best reflect the FCT as used in real life today. 
The traditional underperformance criterion assumes that malingerers produce 
test scores worse than chance performance. Experiments of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
(using the traditional one-sided 5% cut off) indicated sensitivities around 40% and 
specificities around 95% for the underperformance criterion. These findings are in 
line with previous research (i.e. Giger, Merten, Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; 
Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, 2004; Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & 
Merckelbach, 2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, 
& Hillman, 2012; Verschuere, Meijer, & Crombez, 2008). Similarly, when using the 
Area Under the Curve (AUC) as general measure of detection accuracy, lower test 
scores differentiated malingerers from genuine impairment better than chance. In 
particular, our results (AUCs .72 - .80) fell within the range of previous experiments 
as well (Meijer et al., 2007; Shaw et al., 2012). Together, this supports previous 
accuracy estimates and the notion that the FCT features an excellent specificity, but 
lacks in sensitivity. 
The limited effectiveness of the underperformance criterion found in the 
current thesis and studies is not surprising in light of the suggested strategy levels. 
The underperformance criterion, by definition, is only sensitive to level 1 strategies 
and the most prevalent strategy (level 2) is specifically geared towards evading the 
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underperformance criterion. This is demonstrated in Table 6.1 which displays the 
mean FCT z-scores per strategy levels. As expected, in the combined sample level 1 
strategies are associated with very low scores, while level 2 strategies are centred 
around chance performance. Similarly, the distinction between strategy levels 1 and 
2 becomes evident when taking the traditional definition of under- and chance 
performance into account. Figure 6.1 displays a histogram of malingerers’ z-scores 
per strategy level. The underperformance criterion has almost perfect detection 
accuracy for malingerers using a level 1 strategy. Only few malingerers using a level 
2 strategy fall within underperformance levels with the majority remaining within 
chance performance. In sum, the traditional underperformance criterion is excellent 
at detection level 1 strategies, but has a poor detection rate for the remaining 
subgroups of malingerers, which make up the majority of malingerers. As a 
consequence, the sensitivity of the underperformance criterion can be expected to 
approach the prevalence of level 1 strategies. 
Table 6.1. Malingerers’ average  z-scores of number of correct answers selected 
combined and separated per strategy level. 
 Mean SD N 
All -1.48 2.42 114 (100%) 
Level 0 2.35 2.79 8 (11%) 
Level 1 -3.30 1.58 33 (40%) 
Level 2 -0.81 1.40 73 (49%) 
Notes. z-Scores indicate how much the observed test score deviates from chance performance. Scores 
< 0 suggest underperformance; scores > 0 suggest overperformance; scores ≈ 0 suggest chance 
performance. 
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Figure 6.1 Histogram of malingerers’ z-transformed test scores per strategy level. Dashed lines indicate cut-off values used for classification. 
The one-sided 5% cut-off (z < -1.65 = underperformance; -1.65 < z < 1.65 = chance performance; z > 1.65 = overperformance). 
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A potential concern for the evaluation of the FCT’s validity is that the 
definition of chance performance is arbitrary. In case of the FCT, the traditionally 
handled 5% cut-off was likely derived from the commonly used 5% cut-off used in 
hypothesis testing. A possibility to avoid choosing an arbitrary cut-off could be to 
use the AUC as measure of detection accuracy. The AUC indicates the combined 
detection accuracy over all possible cut-offs. However, due to the non-normal 
distribution of malingerers, interpreting the AUC is not as simple as anticipated. To 
illustrate this, the combined empirical sample of malingerers and genuine 
impairment is displayed next to a simulated sample of the same groups with the 
same AUC (see Figure 6.2). The empirical malingerer sample (top) is abnormally 
distributed and the simulated malingerer sample (bottom) assumes both groups 
follow a normal distribution. On the right, the Receiver Operating Characteristic, 
plotting sensitivity against the specificity, is displayed with four specific cut-offs 
indicated (1%, 5%, 10%, & 20%). As demonstrated in the simulated sample 
gradually increasing/decreasing the chosen cut-off is associated with an equally 
gradual increase/decrease of sensitivity and specificity. So, a very conservative cut-
off (e.g. 1%) yields a relatively low sensitivity, while liberal cut-offs (e.g. 20%) 
feature a relatively better sensitivity, which comes at the cost of specificity. This is 
not the case for our empirical sample. Due to the non-normal nature of the 
malingerer distribution, conservative cut-offs already feature relatively good 
detection accuracy. Here the 1% cut-off features almost the same sensitivity as the 
20% cut-off in the normally distributed simulated sample. Furthermore, making the 
cut-off more liberal yields relatively small increases in sensitivity, which means the 
gain in sensitivity is disproportionally smaller to the loss in specificity than predicted 
by the simulated samples.
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Figure 6.2 Distribution of z-scores for the empirical (top) and simulated (bottom) samples of malingered and genuine test performance. The left 
side displays the distribution overlap and the right side the Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) for each sample. Data for the simulated was 
generated using the effect size from the empirical sample assuming both groups were normally distributed. Markers for specific one-sided cut-
offs were added to the ROC. ■ = 1%; ● = 5%; ▲ = 10%; ♦ = 20% 
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Therefore, the detection accuracy of the FCT should not be evaluated with a 
single cut-off or AUC alone. Instead, the shape of the AUC plays an important role 
as it can guide in identifying suitable cut-offs. The unusually high sensitivity at high 
specificities is a consequence of the level 1 strategies within the malingerer sample. 
That means, even though level 1 strategies only make up around 40% of malingerers, 
this subsample can be detected with high accuracy. For example, utilising the more 
conservative 1% cut-off, rather than the traditional 5%, would yield very similar 
sensitivity, but reduces the number of false positive judgements by approximately 
80%. However, this also means that the detection accuracy of the underperformance 
criterion at high specificities is capped at the prevalence of this strategy and other 
approaches are needed to increase the detection accuracy even further. 
 
6.4 How to improve Detection Accuracy? 
Detection accuracy of the FCT could be improved through two pathways. 
One possibility is to promote the prevalence of level 1 strategies, because the 
underperformance criterion already has excellent detection accuracy for this strategy 
level. The results of Chapter 2 suggest that malingerers’ strategy selection can be 
shaped through misdirection. By making the FCT examination look like a polygraph 
session (through fake sensors and machinery) examinees were misdirected into 
believing that their physiological responses were used to infer deception. As a 
consequence, malingerers were more likely to comply with the test instructions 
(level 0 strategy), producing extreme scores that could be detected easily.  In Chapter 
3 the idea to influence the strategy selection process was followed up, by imposing 
cognitive load to promote the adoption of strategies the underperformance criterion 
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detects well. The expectation was that cognitive load limits malingerers’ ability to 
choose a level 2 strategy, thus forcing them to follow a level 1 strategy instead. 
Contrary to this expectation, cognitive load did not affect the strategy selection 
process. Instead, it affected the quality of the strategy execution. Although cognitive 
load did not succeed in promoting the prevalence of level 1 strategies through time 
pressure, increasing the prevalence of level 1 strategies should remain a viable 
pathway to increase the detection accuracy of the FCT. Future attempts could focus 
more on manipulating malingerers’ beliefs, similar to Chapter 2, to misdirect them to 
choose level 1 strategies. Beliefs could be influenced by manipulating the test 
instructions, questions, and trial design. 
 Another possibility to increase detection accuracy of the FCT is to add 
criteria sensitive to the remaining subgroups of malingerers. Level 2 strategies, 
intentional randomization of correct and incorrect answers, are the largest subgroup 
among malingerers. The ‘runs test’ is one criterion to detect randomization 
behaviour. In essence it indicates the frequency an examinee alternates between 
correct and incorrect answers. Due to the human inability to adequately reproduce 
randomness (see Nickerson, 2002; Wagenaar, 1972; Falk & Konold, 1997), 
malingerers are expected to produce more alternations than expected by chance. In 
Chapter 4, the ‘runs test’ can detected malingerers using a level 2 strategy in a 
modified short FCT procedure and in Chapter 5 the unmodified ‘runs test’ also was a 
valid criterion for malingering given sufficient test length. Similarly, in Chapter 5 
another potential criterion was introduced: By manipulating the perceived (not real) 
difficulty of the FCT trials, it was possible to elicit and measure a response bias 
within the malingerers’ randomization behaviour. Thus, both the ‘runs test’ and the 
response bias were able to detect intentional randomization behaviour. Notably, the 
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difference between malingering and genuine performance is less pronounced for 
these criteria than for the underperformance criterion, meaning that the trade-off 
between sensitivity and specificity was worse. 
 Alternatively, criteria for level 1 and level 2 strategies could also be used in 
conjunction by implementing a two-step classification procedure (see “successive-
hurdles approach” in Meehl & Rosen, 1955). For example, first the test score could 
be assessed for underperformance. If the test score does not fall within 
underperformance range, a follow up criterion sensitive to randomization behaviour 
could be applied. Deception is inferred if the response pattern fails on at least one of 
the two criteria. To maintain the predefined false positive rate, the cut-offs of both 
criteria must become more conservative, because adding a second criterion adds not 
only to the sensitivity, but also to the false positive rate.  
 
6.5 Limitations 
 The empirical studies discussed in this thesis come with a number of 
limitations. First, the definition of strategy levels changed throughout the 
experiments and may still be subject to change in the future. For example, in Chapter 
2 strategy levels were defined as reactions to the test instructions and other strategy 
levels. This meant that strategies that do not refer to the choosing behaviour during 
the FCT, such as only reporting to control facial expression, would still be 
categorized into one of the three levels. In following experiments, only responses 
specifically referring to the choosing behaviour were categorized. The reason for this 
change was that it predicted test scores better. While this has led to an improvement 
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of the model’s validity, it means that information on counter strategies other than 
choosing behaviour was lost. 
Second, measuring malingerers’ strategy levels faces several challenges. 
Strategy levels were derived from an open-ended question about the malingerers’ 
test behaviour.  The concern has been raised that self-reports do not make reliable 
data, which could cast doubt on the validity of our strategy level measure (see 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This is not the case here, because self-reports were 
collected under conditions suited for this type of data (see Ericsson & Simon, 1980). 
Self-report measures focussed on the actual test behaviour and not on the examinees’ 
intentions. Self-reports of test behaviour were then recoded into strategy levels by 
blind independent coders. This was done to avoid measuring post-hoc 
rationalizations of examinees’ behaviour. Additionally, self-reports were collected 
immediately after the task, with appropriate debriefing, which eliminates 
interference through delay or intermediary tasks.  
Third, with the exception of the coaching condition in Chapter 4, strategy 
selection was not manipulated. This has led to small and occasionally unequal 
sample sizes for strategy level specific tests. However, instructing malingerers what 
strategy level to follow can skew the detection accuracy estimate. In Chapter 4, the 
effects of coaching, gaining insight into the detection mechanism of the FCT, on 
malingerers were investigated. An interesting finding was that malingerers using 
level 2 strategies performed better when coached than when they developed the level 
2 strategy on their own. A possible reason for this could be, that coached examinees 
had less doubt that they were using the correct countermeasure and therefore 
committing fully to their chosen strategy, or it could be that coached examinees 
started immediately with their counterstrategy, while examinees without coaching 
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have to use the first few trials to develop their strategy. Hence, inducing the strategy 
level per instruction may yield different success rates of the counterstrategies and 
therefore can lead to skewed accuracy estimates. 
Fourth, in terms of ecological validity our findings only extend to university 
student populations. While the test situation - the computerized presentation of trials 
and instructions - as well as the premise - malingerers being aware of the crime 
details - resemble real life conditions all our results are based on a selective 
subcategory of humans. Therefore, care must be taken when applying the FCT to 
other subgroups. For example, other subgroups may have different base rates of 
strategy levels and/or different success rates for the various strategy levels. 
Consequently, detection accuracy estimates may be skewed when the FCT is applied 
to other subgroups. Another potential source of error may stem from the low stakes 
nature of the experimental setting and the lack of additional financial incentive. For 
example, in the Concealed Information Test (CIT), another concealed memory 
detection tool based on psychophysiological measurements, providing participants 
with a financial incentive to remain undetected leads to a significant increase in 
discriminant ability of the test (see Meijer, Klein Selle, Elber, & Ben-Shakhar, 2014; 
Table 2). Although the FCT is a cognitive test, the lack of additional financial 
rewards could have affected our accuracy estimates. For example, without sufficient 
motivation malingerers may have spend less effort and time on deciding on their 
response strategy, which could have lead to higher frequencies of lower level 
strategies than occur in real life applications. Consequently, the contribution of the 
underperformance criterion may be overestimated and more focus should be 
attributed to criteria sensitive to level 2 strategies. 
142 
 
Fifth, another concern for the FCT’s validity is malingerers’ memory for the 
event. For each trial malingerers are forced to guess, because they do not remember 
the correct answer anymore, or a question was formulated about a piece of 
information that was not encoded in the first place, noise is added to the 
measurement and the FCT’s diagnostic value is reduced. Therefore, natural memory 
decay over time becomes a crucial threat that was not assessed in the studies of this 
thesis as the FCT examination followed the encoding phase immediately. This has 
led to a very high memory performance throughout these studies for malingerers, 
which may not be a given in cases of delay between the event and FCT examination. 
However, Nahari and Ben-Shakhar (2011) have demonstrated that detection 
accuracy and memory performance in the FCT and CIT depends on the type of 
details used. They compared central and peripheral details either tested immediately 
following encoding or after one week. For central details, pieces of information 
crucial to the event, the test and memory performance remained high even after a 
delay. In contrast, the test and memory performance declined as a function of delay 
for peripheral details, pieces of information present, but not related to the event. 
Thus, although memory performance in the studies reported in this thesis was high, 
likely due to the lack of delay, this level of memory performance can also be 
obtained after long delays with tests based on central details. Therefore, accuracy 
estimates reported in these studies generalize best to FCTs of similar size based on 
central details only. 
Finally, the prevalence of level 0 strategies - compliance with test 
instructions - may be artificially inflated due to the experimental situation. It is 
possible that due to the situation of partaking in an experiment at a university, some 
malingerers were unaware or realized too late when they had to start with the 
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deception. Consequently, some of the malingerers using a level 0 strategy may not 
have done so if the situation would have been clearer to them. That means the 
prevalence of level 0 strategies is likely inflated, though it remains unknown to what 
degree. However, given that these strategies occurred only occasionally in the 
experiments here, the impact of this problem is limited. Furthermore, any noise 
generated by this problem only makes the detection accuracy estimates more 
conservative, because none of the measures are sensitive or intended to measure 
level 0 strategies. Hence, detection accuracy of the FCT would be better than 
estimated. 
6.6 Test Construction and Practical Application 
Test construction should differentiate between cases of malingered loss of 
memory for a specific event and cognitive deficits. These types of malingered 
performance differ in the potentially test size that can be generated. In cases of 
malingered loss of memory the maximum test size is determined by the available 
pieces of information, as trials cannot be repeated. For many crimes the amount of 
available evidence is small (see Podlesney, 2003) and therefore only a small number 
of trials can be generated. Similarly, even if there is plentiful evidence available, the 
malingerer must also remember the correct answers. It is hard for the investigator to 
correctly estimate what pieces of information a malingerer would remember and 
including trials which force the malingerer to actually guess only add noise to the 
criterion. In contrast, the maximum test size in cases of cognitive deficits is unbound. 
That is, because an ability is tested and for that trials can be repeated infinitely. For 
example, in case of malingered red/green blindness (see Chapter 5) an examinee 
could be presented with a red and green otherwise identical rectangle and asked to 
identify the red one. With colour being the only difference between the objects, this 
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trial remains valid regardless of the number of repetitions. For malingered loss of 
memory a trial features a question with two answer alternatives. For example, 
‘Which object was the murder weapon?’ could be paired with the picture of a gun 
and a knife. Repeating a trial such as this does not make sense, as both answer 
alternatives can be distinguished (even by a genuinely ignorant examinee) and there 
is no reason for the examinee to divert from their previous choice. These trials would 
violate the assumption of the FCT that all trials are independent from each other. 
Consequently, maximum test sizes differ per type of malingered performance. 
 The difference in maximum test size also has consequences for the choice of 
criteria and paths to improve detection accuracy. In particular, criteria such as the 
runs test (see Chapter 3 or Chapter 5) or a response bias (see Chapter 5) require 
larger test sizes to elicit meaningful differences. Furthermore, detection accuracy of 
the response bias in Chapter 5 increased gradually with test size, which suggests that 
even better detection accuracies could be achieved with longer tests. Hence, the 
detection accuracy of a FCT in case of malingered cognitive deficits can be 
increased by using additional criteria on top of the underperformance criterion. Due 
to the theoretically infinite test length even smaller effects can discriminate 
malingered from genuine performance. In cases of malingered loss of memory, the 
test length size is, typically, small, which means the best pathway to increase 
detection accuracy is to increase the prevalence of level 1 strategies, because they are 
well detected regardless of test length. 
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6.7 Innovation in Practical Application 
The FCT can be applied in various situations to detect malingered 
performance. Regardless the type of malingering, cognitive deficits or memory loss, 
a high specificity is desirable for both clinical and criminal investigations. Instead, 
the FCT could be used as a screening tool for criminal cases with a large number of 
suspects. For example, if a crime was committed in a large corporation, investigators 
may lack the manpower to interview all employees. By using the FCT as a screening 
tool, for crime relevant knowledge, the large group of potential suspects could be 
reduced to a manageable size. This application has several benefits: (i) A more 
liberal cut-off can be selected, resulting in higher detection rates. Additionally, the 
choice of the cut-off becomes less arbitrary as the investigator can set the cut-off to 
match the available manpower. If there are 100 suspects and 25 interviews can be 
conducted, the acceptable false positive rate can be set to 25%; (ii) The impact of 
false positives is less severe, as the only consequence of failing the test is to be 
subjected to the follow-up procedure; (iii) Manpower could be saved even further by 
starting the follow up procedure with the least likely FCT scores first. That is, 
because suspects with concealed knowledge mimicking ignorance have a much 
higher likelihood to produce very unlikely scores than expected by chance; and (iv) 
The FCT can be administered easily and the test takes very little time, which are 
relevant constraints in such situations. Naturally, when applying the FCT as 
screening tool it is imperative not to attach meaning to the test outcome. All focus 
and conclusions should be derived from the follow-up test.  
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6.8 Challenges and Future Directions 
Several aspects of Forced Choice Testing require further attention. One of the 
core assumptions of the FCT is that answer alternative pairs featured in the trials are 
equally plausible (Doob & Kirschenbaum, 1973). This is especially important for 
cases of malingered memory loss, because answer alternative pairs refer to events 
and are therefore not automatically equally plausible (see Frederick, Carter, & 
Powel, 1995). The standard validation procedure for a FCT to detect malingered 
memory loss is to present the questions and answer alternative pairs to a small group 
of examinees, who are completely ignorant to the event, and ask them to select the 
correct answers. The problem is defining exactly when an answer alternative pair 
should be considered biased. Experiments in this thesis and others (for example 
Meijer et al., 2007; Shaw et al., 2012) used a rule proposed by Merckelbach et al. 
(2002). According to this rule, pairs of which one of the two answer alternatives is 
selected by more than 70% are considered biased. However, there is no objective 
reason to set the cut-off at 70% and not for example at 75%. Similarly, there is no 
guideline that suggests how large the validation sample should be. This is 
problematic, because the rule does not differentiate instances with biased answer 
alternative pairs from instances that pass the threshold due to poor sampling. The 
former is the type of pairs that should be excluded, whereas the latter is a side effect 
of using small samples. Ideally, the validation sample should be as large as possible 
to provide the best estimate (see Law of Large Numbers), but that leads to new 
practical challenges. In sum, the validation process of FCT answer alternative lacks 
scientific scrutiny and further research is needed in order to improve the objective 
basis of the FCT.  
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 Another concern is that the relationship between test size and detection 
accuracy of the underperformance has not been directly investigated. Some authors 
recommend a minimum of 12 trials in cases of malingered memory loss (Van 
Oorsouw, & Merckelbach, 2010), while other suggest a FCT should at least contain 
25 trials (Denney, 1996; Frederick, Carter, & Powel, 1995). As seen in Table 1.1, 
experiments using only 12 trials do detect significant proportions of malingerers (27 
- 42%; e.g. Meijer et al., 2007; Shaw et al., 2012), but the best sensitivity (≈ 60%; 
Jelicic et al., 2004; Verschuere et al., 2008) has been found in FCTs with 25 trials. 
Here, in Chapter 5, we only explored the effect of test length on criteria sensitive to 
level 2 strategies, but not the underperformance criterion. Therefore, future research 
is needed to determine the minimum test size required and to map the relationship 
between detection accuracy and test size for the underperformance criterion. 
So far, only the choices examinees make in the FCT have been evaluated as 
potential criteria for malingering. Interpreting the choosing pattern alone is 
challenging due to the issues outlined above. To increase the detection of malingered 
performance research could focus on additional measures that are independent of the 
response strategies e.g. mouse dynamics (Freeman, Ambady, Johnson, & Rule, 
2008; Freeman, Dale, & Farmer, 2011; Monaro, Gamberini, & Sartori, 2017). In 
essence, these studies indicate that, if forced to make a binary selection using a 
computer mouse, a drift towards the correct/relevant answer alternative can be 
detected when selecting the incorrect answer instead. In the FCT malingerers could 
be expected to show a larger drift motion when selecting an incorrect answer than 
when selecting a correct one. Examinees with genuine impairment would not be 
expected to show a differential response. This measure could potentially be used as 
an auxiliary criterion for the FCT to reduce the false positive rates. Thus, much more 
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liberal cut-offs can be handled when applying the underperformance or other criteria, 
because deception would only be inferred in the presence of systematic mouse 
movements. 
 A final concern is that it has been neglected to investigate the influence a 
FCT exerts on subsequent aspects of criminal and clinical investigations. While 
examinees are not directly told the correct answers to the FCT’s questions, they are 
still exposed to the correct answers. A consequence could be that suspects in 
criminal investigations become aware of what information the investigator holds. 
This would be problematic for the Strategic Use of Evidence interviewing technique 
(SUE; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Luke, 2014), as it requires the investigator to strategically reveal the available 
evidence in order to expose the suspects’ lies. Vice versa, through educated guessing 
on FCT filler trials, that is trials with no correct answer alternative, the impression 
could be generated that implies that the investigators have more knowledge than they 
do. This could be beneficial for example for the Scharff technique (Granhag, 
Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014), 
which is built on the idea to elicit new information from suspects, by tricking them 
into believing the information is already known. Hence, future research should not 
only concern itself with improving the FCT itself, but also investigating the 
influence it exerts on the surrounding criminal and clinical investigation.  
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 The FCT can be used as a tool to detect malingered memory loss or 
malingered cognitive deficits. Three distinct response strategies have been identified 
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within the malingerer sample and linked to the traditional FCT criterion, 
underperformance, as well as other criteria such as the runs test. The model 
corresponds well to the data of the experiments featured here and it serves as an aid 
for research to develop new criteria or adjust the paradigm in order to increase the 
detection accuracy even further. Due to the non-normal distribution of the malingerer 
population, both, single cut-offs and the AUC, should be taken into account when 
choosing a definition of malingered performance. For example, it was demonstrated 
earlier that by reducing the traditional 5% cut-off to a more conservative 1% the loss 
in sensitivity is disproportionally smaller than to what would be expected under a 
normal distribution. Furthermore, two pathways were discussed to increase the 
detection accuracy. Either the prevalence of level 1 strategies, which are well 
detected by the traditional criterion, could be increased, or new criteria sensitive to 
the largest subgroup of malingerers, level 2 strategies, need to be developed and 
implemented. Which pathway is best suited to increase detection accuracy depends 
on the type of malingered deficit. Examiners should distinguish between test 
construction for cases of malingered cognitive deficits and cases of malingered 
memory loss. The former, refers to a loss of an ability, which has the consequence 
that, in theory, an infinite number of trials can be generated and parameters such as 
perceived difficulty can be objectively manipulated. Therefore, other criteria such 
the runs test or within subject response biases are well suited for this situation. In 
contrast, cases of malingered memory loss have a limited maximum test size, which 
can be problematic for criteria such as the runs test. Instead, detection accuracy 
could best be improved by promoting level 1 strategies. Many challenges remain for 
future research to address. Practical aspects, such as the relationship between test 
size and detection accuracy or developing objective or uniform rules to determine 
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biased answer alternative pairs must be addressed to aid test construction. 
Furthermore, the search for strategy independent auxiliary criteria may prove a 
valuable addition to the existing criteria and future research should focus on the role 
and influence of the FCT as part of a clinical/criminal investigation. 
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